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The Left: Can it Be Right for Lebanon? 
The Path and Prospects of the Leftist Movement in Lebanon 
 
 
Karma Khayat 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the path and prospects of Leftist movements in Lebanon. It 
points out their main successes and flaws, and examines their future possibilities. The 
research attempts to go beyond historical personal narratives by critically highlighting the 
general traits and major stages of the Lebanese Left since its inception while providing a 
critical account of what has been done and what could be achieved in the future. The aim is to 
answer the question asked in the title of the thesis: has a Leftist approach been, or will it ever 
be, a realistic option for Lebanon? The thesis examines two major Left-wing parties in 
Lebanon: the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). It 
also looks at the main alliances organized by Leftist parties in Lebanon: the Lebanese 
National Movement (LNM) and Lebanese National Resistance Front (LNRF). Leftist 
experiences in other countries are compared with Lebanon’s own to investigate the possibility 
of making the Left right for Lebanon in the future. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 – Situating the Thesis 
Belonging to a specific sect is rooted in Lebanese society since the formation 
of Greater Lebanon (Qbanji, 2009: 27). In fact, the Lebanese constitution, which 
confirms political, judiciary and civil equality for all citizens, establishes, at the same 
time, for the conditions of their inequality describing them as followers (ra‘aya) of 
religious groups with varying shares of the political power and public office 
(Traboulsi, 2008: 186). Chaoul rightfully notes that the role of sects in Lebanon goes 
beyond the religious framework (Qbanji, 2009: 75); they actually share state power in 
what is believed to be a ‘consociational’ democracy making Lebanese politics and 
political parties unthinkable outside a religious/sectarian box. 
 This distinctive kind of democracy is based on a consensus between the 
components of society –sects in this case– on general policy orientations and the 
distribution of public positions. It is no secret that this consociational democracy has 
several drawbacks on many levels not least of which are “the limitation of the 
efficacy of political parties and the constraints on the development of a concept of 
citizenship” (Ayubi, 1996: 397). Political representation is limited to representatives 
of the different sects (Qbanji, 2009: 82). Thus, in most cases, Lebanese parties largely 
overlap with Lebanese sects. 
 Leftist parties in Lebanon have so far failed to radically change this “fragile 
political/sectarian system” (Matar and Dakhlallah, 2006: 23) designed under the 
pretext of safeguarding Lebanon’s social complexity. This is not to say that they have 
not been trying. Rather, there are flaws in the effort of Leftist parties, one that goes 
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back to 1907 according to Mohamad Dakroub (2007:100) and continues till the 
present day. These flaws, that will be revealed through the thesis’ case studies, 
prevented the Lebanese Left from fulfilling their aims, namely overcoming political 
mobilization according to sectarian identity, a Lebanese constant considered by 
former Prime Minister Salim El-Hoss the main obstacle facing radical change (Sadek, 
2001: 31). 
 Can the Left be right for Lebanon? The proposed research critically highlights 
the path that Leftist parties have taken in Lebanon while assessing their 
accomplishments and mishaps regarding the Lebanese system. The thesis aims to 
evaluate whether a leftist approach has been or will ever be a viable option for a 
country like Lebanon. This is the contribution this research hopes to add to the 
existing literature on the Left in Lebanon. 
 
1.2 – Research Questions 
The main research question problematized in this thesis is the following: Is the 
Leftist approach a realistic option for Lebanon? It contains a number of layers, 
however: What are the major achievements and failures of Leftist parties? What are 
the major achievements and failures of the main alliances that have existed between 
the parties of the Lebanese Left? And, finally, what should the Lebanese Left do to 
succeed? Answering these three questions brings us closer to answering whether the 
Left can present a reasonable alternative to the existing sectarian system. 
 
1.3 – Methodology and Case Selection 
As mentioned earlier, this research investigates the key stages of the Leftist 
movement in Lebanon. Particular attention will be paid to the efforts made to infuse 
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change into the country’s sectarian system, and whether they were rewarding or not. 
This examination will be conducted individually for each party, then on alliances 
among Leftist parties to review what has happened and to reflect on future prospects. 
The main objective of this thesis is to assess the efficiency of the Left and 
evaluate whether this approach can be suitable to Lebanon’s plural society. It builds 
on the existing literature but is largely based on original material and documented 
analysis. 
In addition to the examination of the literature, this study builds on specific 
case studies particularly significant for the Lebanese Left to answer the research 
question. First, this thesis will investigate two major leftist parties. Looking at these 
cases will allow us to understand the major achievements and failures of Leftist 
parties. 
There are many parties in Lebanon that are labeled leftist. Among these parties 
are: the Lebanese Communist Party, the Communist Action Organization (currently 
not active), the People’s Movement, the Popular Nasserite Organization, the 
Movement of Independent Nasserites- Al-Mourabitoun, the Progressive Socialist 
Party, the Baath Party and the Democratic Left.1 
The parties that were selected as case studies for this thesis are the Lebanese 
Communist Party (LCP) and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). Two main reasons 
are behind this choice: first, thoroughly studying more parties goes beyond the scope 
of this thesis. On another note, attempting to fit more parties within the limits of this 
thesis means that more importance would be given to breadth over depth, while for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Worthy of note is that three out of the eight mentioned parties (the PSP, the Baath Party and the 
Democratic Left) are currently represented in parliament. However, it is naïve to imply that the 
Lebanese Left is well represented given the activities of these parties and the political coalitions they 
have joined to attain parliamentary seats. 
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this particular study, depth should be given more weight. Another reason for this 
choice is the lack of relevant literature given that what is written about the LCP and 
the PSP significantly exceeds what is written about other parties like the Baath Party 
and the CAO. However, this choice does not make this research less relevant seeing 
as the chosen parties are two of the main and most influential Leftist parties in 
Lebanon thus studying their failures can significantly contribute to the thesis question. 
Additionally, unlike some other leftist parties, both parties still exist today and 
continue to draw the path of the so-called Lebanese Left. 
Nevertheless, this does not deny the importance of smaller Left-wing parties 
and their influence in the course of events related to the path the Lebanese Left has 
taken. In fact, it is essential to examine such parties as indispensable pieces of the 
mosaic. 
This thesis also examines the major achievements and failures of the main 
alliances that have existed between the parties of the Lebanese Left? It looks at the 
coalitions formed among leftist parties, reviewing the LNM and the LNRF will give 
an answer to the above question. It is evident that in recent times alliances among 
Leftist parties in Lebanon have been rare. Although hypothetically they fall under the 
same umbrella, these parties seem to fail to be in agreement, even with regards to 
fundamental issues. In fact, political parties in Lebanon are in crisis, as Ziad Majed 
asserts (Sadek, 1999: 342). Shawkat Ashti agrees and adds that this crisis is affecting 
the parties’ basic foundations, their future prospects and their intellectual identity, in 
addition to their organizational frameworks and internal relations (2004: 9). It should 
be added that this crisis, which impacted parties’ performances and contributed to 
their decline, has also affected the inter-party relations and left parties unable to find 
common grounds. In fact, this crisis affects Leftist parties in particular since, unlike 
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most of the other parties, they are not founded on sectarian identities that they can fall 
back on whenever needed. 
However, In the course of Lebanese history, several alliances among the 
Leftist parties have occurred, major and minor ones, successful and failed ones. This 
thesis will look at the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) formed in 1969 and 
presided by Kamal Junblat (Traboulsi, 2008: 256). The LNM was undoubtedly the 
most remarkable alliance of the Lebanese Left: on the one hand, its affiliations were 
essentially leftist parties, and on the other hand, it represents the instance when the 
Left in Lebanon was almost successful in infusing major change to the Lebanese 
sectarian system.  
 Very much related to the LNM is the Lebanese National Resistance Front 
(LNRF), better-knows by its acronym, Jamoul, initiated by the LCP, the CAO and the 
Arab Socialist Labor Party in September 1982 (Ibid: 387). The LNRF will be looked 
at but less extensively though it is an important instance in that it reflects the effort 
the Lebanese Left has invested to fight an exterior enemy, Israel in this case. 
 Interestingly, most central alliances among Leftist parties have occurred 
during the years of the Lebanese Civil War. This fact raises an intriguing question: 
given that the civil war had presented good grounds for parties to attract members 
(Ashti, 2004: 59), could it be that armed conflict presents the strongest common 
ground for the parties of the Left? This point will be examined in this thesis. 
Third, what should the Lebanese Left do to succeed? Here examples of the 
Left in other countries will be referred to. It is obvious that the decline of the Left is 
not exclusive to Lebanon (Olsen, Koband Hough, 2010). While Giddens (1994) 
advances that the Left in the present day has turned defensive rather than radical, Bell 
argues that the Left has disappeared in some European countries (Ibid: 33). 
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Accordingly, and since it is clear that this decline is not exclusive to Lebanon, this 
study will also highlight some lessons that should be drawn from the experience of 
Leftist movements in other countries. The cases that will be referred to are those of 
parties in Britain and France. 
This section will attempt to put down a series of suggestions that possibly will 
help improve the status of the Leftist parties in Lebanon based on the previously 
mentioned case studies in addition to this section which will serve as comparison to 
the Left in other countries. It will bring to light the internal and external factors that 
led to the decline of the Left, in order to propose relevant recommendations for the 
future. This, hopefully, will answer the main question of this thesis: What should the 
Lebanese Left do to succeed? 
 
1.4 – Map of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. It opens with an introductory chapter 
explaining the topic and the methodology. The second chapter presents a brief 
literature review and an overview of Leftist parties in Lebanon. The third and the 
fourth chapters include overviews of the chosen parties, followed by their main 
achievements and failures over time. The fifth chapter highlights the main alliances 
the Leftist parties have managed to create among themselves and describes the path 
these alliances have taken. The conclusion underscores the Lebanese Left’s prospects 
and what it should do in the future while drawing from its own experience as well as 
Leftist experiences in other countries. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE RISE OF SECTARIAN PARTIES 
 
2.1– Introduction 
This chapter examines leftist parties in Lebanon. It opens with an overview of 
Lebanese political parties in relation to the sectarian system, focusing on the leftist 
parties’ integration into the Lebanese sectarian system. It then sheds light on the 
emergence and evolution of a number of leftist parties in the country. 
Sectarian parties in postwar Lebanon have marginalized the role of leftist 
parties. Whether due to the general collapse of the Left in the Arab world after the 
1967 defeat, or their robust ability to distribute social welfare (Cammett and Issar, 
2009), sectarian parties dominate the postwar Lebanese political scene. This chapter 
examines the array of leftist parties in Lebanon. It surveys their emergence, evolution 
and transformation within the context of Lebanon’s sectarian system. 
 
2.2 – The Lebanese Left: A Review of the Literature  
The Left and Arab revolutionaries in Lebanon were not homogenous but were 
largely gathered around the Palestinian cause (Nemr, 2004:14). According to Gordon, 
“the importance of the Lebanese Left was extra-parliamentary, in the street, on the 
campus, in the refugee camp” an importance it gained through tactics: “newspaper 
propaganda, demonstrations, strikes, and ultimately resort to the barricade, the 
Klashnikov, the bomb” (1980: 170). 
 In particular, the Communist Party (LCP) was close to people’s everyday life 
and presented an alternative to sectarian parties (Ashti, 2004: 49-50). However, Hawi 
asserted in the mid-1990s that the revolutionary process is no longer possible within 
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the frameworks of the LCP, even though the party has distinguished itself from other 
communist parties with certain stands or positions that prevented it from collapsing 
(Charbel, 2005: 176). 
 Another main party affiliated with the Left is the Progressive Socialist Party 
(PSP). The PSP, which falls under “the actions of what could be called feudal 
socialism” (Timoviv 2000: 206), had been very influential namely as leader of the 
Lebanese National Movement. However, after the assassination of Kamal Junblat and 
other circumstances accompanying it, the PSP took a defensive approach. Later on it 
allied with its “previous enemies” under the slogan of “dialogue” and sectarian and 
political “reconciliation” (Ashti, 2004: 281). 
As Richani suggests, few are the studies that examine Lebanon’s political 
parties (1998: 3). Some of these studies tackle the rise and history of Leftist parties in 
Lebanon (Dakroub, 2007; Ashti, 2004;Ismael Ismael 1998and Traboulsi 1997) Others 
put forward criticism of these parties individually (Dalloul, 2010; Edde, 2005; 
Timoviv, 2000; Traboulsi, 1997) and propose possible reforms (Edde, 2005; Nemr, 
2004). Others study the political sectarian system in Lebanon, its consequences, and 
its potential remedies (Haddad, 2008; Qbanji, 2005; Gordon, 1980).In fact, most of 
the references consulted and mentioned in this study fall within the above-mentioned 
frameworks. 
 However, these studies do not bring to light the Lebanese Left’s main 
strengths and weaknesses, or examine future possibilities for reform of the Lebanese 
sectarian system. The proposed research goes beyond surveying the facts and 
surpasses the specificities of individual parties: it highlights the general traits and 
major stages of the Lebanese Left while providing a critical account of what has been 
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done and what should be done, while drawing from experiences of the Left in 
Lebanon and elsewhere.  
 This study argues that attempts by the Lebanese Left to change the political 
sectarian system have been flawed throughout Lebanon’s history. This thesis 
considers that this failure has not only been caused by the established and deeply 
rooted sectarian system –though it is one of the causes– but also by the choices made 
by Leftist parties themselves, at different levels, and the priorities they have set 
themselves, namely political reforms at the expense of social and economic reforms. 
 
2.3 –Ta’ifa as a Nation 
 Ussama Makdisi underscores the paradox of having national unity in a multi-
religious society wherein religion stands as the citizens’ most important public 
attribute (Makdisi, 1996). Constant failures to lead the Lebanese away from pre-
modern loyalties based on religion that inhibit the growth of a democratic, civil, and 
secular society arguably produced a dichotomy between Ta’ifiyya (sectarianism) and 
Wataniyya (patriotism) in which sectarianism prevailed. The sect became the quasi-
nation defined against other sects as elites sought to bring about an exclusively 
religious definition of community. The deployment of religious-based politics by 
sectarian elites opened the possibility of popular mobilization along communal lines 
and reduced the influence of secular parties. 
In Lebanon, political organizations with sectarian orientations play a crucial 
role in distributing social welfare (Cammett and Issar, 2009). The degree to which 
sectarian parties cater to members of out-groups depends not only on electoral 
incentives but also on non-electoral aims such as mobilizing communities for several 
purposes (Ibid). Hence, one could make the case that the extensive social welfare 
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power of sectarian parties lured large popular masses toward them, condensing the 
share of leftist parties and constraining their political influence.  
Ersun Kurtulus also suggests that four elements of continuity exist and create 
an Independence-Integration cleavage causing the problem of collective self-
determination in Lebanon (Kurtulus, 2009).The Independence-Integration cleavage in 
Lebanon is rooted in sectarian lines, which makes it difficult to see the Lebanese as 
collective actors exercising collective self-determination. Kurtulus contends that these 
four elements of continuity raise doubts about the strength of a community that 
remains deeply fragmented and fragile: first, the confessional nature of Lebanese 
politics marked by sectarian loyalties and the predominant role of confessional 
leaderships; second, the omnipresence of transnational alliances and mobilization of 
external support for promoting domestic goals; third, the confessional nature of 
political rhetoric, especially in relation to foreign affair; and, fourth, the various forms 
of foreign intervention in Lebanon. 
These elements of continuity suggest that Lebanon remains a “precarious 
republic”in which Lebanese remain unsufficiently integrated and unable to act as a 
collective actor with the aim of collective self-determination (Kurtulus, 2009). 
Lebanon thus remains a quasi-federal state as it still fails to serve all Lebanese 
equally, leaving it to parties to provide communal support that often comes on a 
sectarian basis and consequently reinforces sectarianism. A case in point is 
Hezbollah’s welfare system that is often considered the most developpend in the 
country (Harik, 2004). Beyond providing schools, clinics, day-care centers, jobs, and 
financial support to its community, Hezbollah offers the historically disadvantaged 
and marginalized Shi’a in Lebanon a sense of identity and pride (Gerges, 2006). 
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2.4– The Sectarianization of Leftist Principles 
Left-wing parties constitute the bulk of multi-sectarian political groups in 
Lebanon. Some of these parties have opposed the established clientalist system in the 
country, while others embraced Marxist principles. Even though these movements are 
multi-sectarian, many of them have come to coexist with confessional system, even 
though they call for the abolishment of political sectarianism. The Taif Accord 
includes a special segment on the abolition of political sectarianism under the 
“Political Reforms” section. It regards this as “a fundamental national objective” that 
should be attained gradually. However, Taif provides no timetable for 
deconfessionalization.2 
As‛ad Abu-Khalil contends that the failure and “perceived bankruptcy” of the 
Lebanese and the Palestinian Left gave rise to Islamic fundamentalist groups in 
Lebanon. Abu-Khalil adds that “slogans of change and revolution were monopolized 
by the Left at a time when religious movements in Lebanon were generally 
conservative, [while] Shiites were until the late seventies drawn into leftist political 
organizations because they were alienated from the political system in the country” 
(Abu-Khalil, 1991). 
In addition to Makdisi’s dichotomy between sectarianism and patriotism, Elie 
A. Salem talks about another dichotomy between rich and poor that existed in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See <http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/lebanon/taif.htm> 
“Abolishing political sectarianism is a fundamental national objective. To achieve it, it is required that 
efforts be made in accordance with a phased plan. The Chamber of Deputies elected on the basis of 
equal sharing by Christians and Muslims shall adopt the proper measures to achieve this objective and 
to form a national council which is headed by the president of the republic and which includes, in 
addition to the prime minister and the Chamber of Deputies speaker, political, intellectual, and social 
notables. The council's task will be to examine and propose the means capable of abolishing 
sectarianism, to present them to the Chamber of Deputies and the cabinet, and to observe 
implementation of the phased plan.” 
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Lebanon and had a direct impact on leftist principles. A direct consequence of this 
dichotomy, the urbanization of Lebanon and Beirut provided for the emergence of 
slum settlements of rural populations and Palestinian refugee camps around the 
capital. These constituted a fertile ground for the development of ideological leftist 
and revolutionary movements. As Imam Musa al-Sadr mobilized Shi‛a communities, 
“the Palestinians, and the Muslim Nasirist movements in Beirut and Sidon, also 
tapped the slum belt and mobilized its youth under their ideological slogans. 
Passionate ideological politics exploited poverty and used it as a ramming rod against 
the tottering institutions of the state” (Salem, 1979). Salem argues that this was the 
beginning of what he terms “the sectarianization of leftist principles” (1979: 449). 
Political parties in Lebanon, especially leftist ones, face many limitations and 
problems. The postwar era reinforced the communal nature of society and few parties 
are able to surmount the confessional barrier (El Khazen, 2003). Moreover, secular-
oriented parties shared a “rigid political platform” and were highly influenced by 
political and ideological principles originating from other Arab states. Consequently, 
parties constantly failed to foster national unity and collaborate beyond the formation 
of temporary electoral alliances (Ibid.).  
Leftist and nationalist parties, particularly the Syrian Social Nationalist Party 
(SSNP) and the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), “were not associated with any 
particular community and/ or region”, but they were often unable to relate to the 
working classes the way other sectarian parties like Hezbollah did. As Khazen asserts, 
the Progressive Socialist Party has become a Druze-oriented party, while the SSNP 
maintained a discourse revolving around Syrian nationalism, and the Ba‛ath party 
adhered to its principles of Arab unity and the common aspirations of the Arab people 
(Khazen, 2003). 
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2.5– Leftist Parties in Lebanon 
This section examines four leftist parties: the Communist Action Organization 
(CAO), the Arab Socialist Action Party (ASAP), the Independent Nasserite 
Movement (INM), and the Nasserite Populist Movement (NPM). Although these 
parties will not be considered as detailed case studies in this research, discussing them 
allows a better overview of the Left since they played important roles on different 
levels at different times. 
 
2.5.1 – Communist Action Organization (CAO) 
The establishment and evolution of the CAO in Lebanon can be highlighted 
through several historical incidences. The origins of the CAO trace back to the Arab 
Nationalist Movement (ANM) (harakat al-Qawmiyin al-Arab), even though it later 
deviated from the latter’s orientation (Zebian, 1977: 205). The CAO mutated from the 
Arab Nationalist Movement, to the Lebanese Socialist Organization (Munazzamat al- 
Ishtirakiyin al-Arab) and then to the declaration of the Communist Action 
Organization in May 1971 (Zebian, 1977: 206) where the communist identity was 
adopted, signaling the rupture with the past pan-nationalist thinking and its bourgeois 
reality (Traboulsi, 1997: 119). Although the CAO does not exist today, it is important 
to outline three main historical contexts that portray the experience of the CAO as a 
major leftist organization in the modern Lebanese history. 
 
The Arab Context 
Muhsen Ibrahim, the Secretary General of the CAO, underscores the Arab 
context in which the CAO emerged: namely the crisis of the Arab national liberation 
movement upon the defeat of June 1967, in both its wings, the nationalist and the 
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communist, (Ibrahim, 1983: 230). Ibrahim states that the CAO emerged from a 
Marxist Leninist split within the nationalistic movement itself. Therefore, the crisis of 
the Arab nationalist liberation movement, inspired by the leadership of Jamal Abdel 
Nasser and his promising nationalist and patriotic visions at that time, paved the road 
to the formation of the CAO in Lebanon. 
The crisis within the Arab nationalist liberation movement was due to the 
class struggle within the popular bases, especially in the 1960s. This struggle took 
many forms: an ideological clash, a political split, and a social difference among the 
components of the movement. The main and essential slogans and principles of the 
movement were, according to Ibrahim, supplied by the petite bourgeoisie. Hence, 
there was a political, social, and economic crisis led by an alliance of the bourgeoisies 
and the landlords, which caused discontent among the proletariat class across the 
Arab World. Moreover, this ruling alliance did not try to contain the spread of 
imperialism, Zionism, and foreign intervention in the region (Ibrahim, 1983: 230-
231). 
Along those lines, the CAO outlined several major themes in its political 
mandate that it wanted to spread throughout the Arab World the political struggle 
against imperialism to achieve national political and economic liberation; the struggle 
for the pan-nationalist cause of liberating the Occupied Arab Territories of 1967, and 
to safeguard the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and an 
independent state; the struggle against ending Arab-Soviet relations and to restore and 
strengthen the alliance with the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries; the 
struggle against exploiting the working classes and burdening it with the economic 
crises that the Arab bourgeois regimes suffer from, while ensuring the social rights of 
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the Arab popular masses; and the struggle against repression to ensure democratic 
freedoms for the popular movement (Ibrahim, 1983: 260). 
 
The Lebanese Context 
The Lebanese context of the CAO’s emergence can be summarized by the 
crisis of the Lebanese Patriotic Democratic Work (Al-‘amal al-watani al-dimuqrati) 
that culminated in the 1960s, with its three main wings: the Lebanese democratic 
corrective wing (al-janah al-watani al-dimuqrati al-isla7i al-lubnani) represented by 
the PSP; the communist wing represented by the LCP; and the Arab pan-nationalistic 
wing represented by the Movement of Arab Nationalists. 
These three wings together formed the Front of the Patriotic Progressive 
Parties, Bodies and Personnel in Lebanon (Jabhat al-Ahzab wa-lhay’at wal-
shakhsiyat al-wataniya wal-taqadumiya fi Lubnan) under the leadership of Kamal 
Junblat. This front included additional parties for intermittent periods, and a number 
of independent political figures. This experience was one of the first stages of the 
establishment of the Left in Lebanon, regardless of the ideological differences among 
its constituent units (Ibrahim, 1983: 275 – 277). The opposing views that emerged 
within the front led to the eruption of its main crisis: the position vis-à-vis the 
sectarian system.  
The CAO represented an Arab communist faction that succeeded in applying 
the “Creative Marxist Leninist” approach to the Arab situation (Ibrahim, 1983: 282). 
This gave the CAO strength on the Lebanese level, especially in its social, economic, 
and political approaches to the Lebanese system. The main formative stages of the 
CAO in the Lebanese context were between the years 1968 and 1973: first, the 
emergence of the Marxist Leninist factions within the Lebanese branch of Arab 
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Nationalist Movement in 1968; second, the establishment of the Lebanese Socialist 
Organization (Munazzamat al-Ishtirakiyin al-Arab) in 1969; third, the declaration of 
the establishment of a joint organization under the name of Lebanese Socialist 
Organization – Socialist Lebanon (munazzamat al-Ishtirakiyin al-Arab- Lubnan al-
Ishtiraki), in 1970; and fourth, the establishment of the CAO and its first conference 
in the spring of 1973.  
 
The CAO and the Lebanese Civil War 
The CAO was thus a result of a merger between Socialist Lebanon and the 
Lebanese Socialist Organization.3The events that took place in Lebanon and the 
region after June 1967 strengthened the relationship between these organizations, 
most importantly the Israeli raid on Beirut airport. On the intellectual level, 
interaction also grew between the parties with Lebanese Socialist Organization being 
self-critical (Traboulsi, 1997: 101). The agreement over the Palestinian guerilla action 
(al-amal al-fida’i) was another major fact that brought them together. According to 
Traboulsi, the CAO was the most spontaneous manifestation of the changes of 
Lebanese society and the implications of the Arab context after 1967 (Ibid: 102). 
Zebian argues that the CAO represented a detachment from the core Ba‛athist 
beliefs, and also from the overall nationalist Arab thinking. According to him, what 
happened to Arab nationalist thinking during the 1960s has caused the diversion to 
Marxism, in the form of the CAO and this was the reason behind the merger that 
happened between the two organizations (1977: 220). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3Socialist Lebanon was established in the middle 1960s, and included former Ba‛athist intellectuals 
who adopted Marxism as their ideology. 
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The CAO believed that change in Lebanon can be achieved democratically, as 
many other leftist organizations. Moreover, the CAO was an active member at all 
fronts established in Lebanon since the early 1970s in support of Palestine in guerilla 
action. The CAO was a member of the Arab Front Participating in the Palestinian 
Revolution (al-Jabha al-Arabiya al-Musharika fi al-Thawra al-Falastiniya), which 
gave it an important role in the support of the Palestinian Resistance (Zebian, 1977: 
220-221). 
The CAO found itself fighting as a faction of the National Movement, against 
the Right. Its embrace of armed struggle was not a drawback against its main path of 
work rather than a development of it. This can be identified from the main ideology 
(Marxist-Leninist) of the CAO, where armed struggle represents the most elite form 
of social and patriotic struggle. The reactionary violence of the Right was faced with a 
revolutionary violence (Zebian, 1977: 222). Fawaz Traboulsi, a member of the 
political bureau and a key leader of the CAO, noted in September 1976 that “the 
changes that shaped the conflict in Lebanon and in the Arab region, resulted in the 
Lebanese regime’s tendency towards dealing with armed oppression against popular 
movements, and towards alliance with Fascist armed forces who aim to strike the 
Palestinian Resistance, and seize the political and social change with armed violence. 
For that reason, the CAO fought to defeat this reactionary attack for the independence 
of Lebanon, its unity, and sovereignty, throughout building a democratic secular 
system” (Zebian, 223). 
Although the parties forming the CAO seemed to be in harmony at first, 
Traboulsi asserts that soon enough disagreements emerged between the organizations 
that turned out to be heterogeneous. They disagreed on the form of the organization, 
the stand from the occurrences and the distribution roles and internal work (1997: 
18 
 
116-117). Splits occurred for several reasons: some who considered that the Lebanese 
context does not justify the existence of a new communist party joined with the 
Palestinian resistance; others argued that the Lebanese Communist Party is more 
popular and effective within the Labor community, while others considered that 
armed struggle should be adopted but not through Palestinians resistance (Traboulsi, 
1997: 128-129).  Although Traboulsi argues that the CAO was able to overcome 
difficulties (Ibid: 132), the CAO is no longer active today and the points above are 
main reasons why this party ceased to exist. 
 
2.5.2 – The Arab Socialist Action Party (ASAP) 
The Arab Socialist Action Party (Hizb al-Amal al-Ishtiraki al-Arabi) is a result 
of the Ideological transformation of the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) that 
allowed for the creation of the Palestinian Popular Liberation Front (al-Jabha al-
Sha‛biya li-tahrir Falastin), the Palestinian Democratic Liberation Front (al-Jabha al-
Dimuqratiya li-tahrir Falastin), the Communist Action Organization, and the Arab 
Socialist Action Party (Zebian, 1977: 224). The party emerged as a Marxist-Leninist 
variation from the ANM. Generally speaking, the emerging parties from ANM were 
categorized as Leftist organizations.  
The ASAP considered each Arab country part of the whole Arab nation, thus 
taking into consideration the different objective circumstances in each country. 
Consequently, branches of ASAP were established in most of the Arab countries in 
recognition of every country (it existed in Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Palestine). 
However, the ASAP had difficult beginnings in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. 
Georges Habash, the secretary general of the party argues that “the defeat of 
June 1967 was seen as a pan-nationalist defeat and created new circumstances. As a 
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result, it is normal that this incidence creates a clearer political view for the cause of 
revolution and its path”.4 After the 1967 defeat, the ASM reshaped itself into a new 
political organization, called the Arab Socialist Action Party. The name expressed the 
radical change that occurred to the theoretical, practical, and social structure of the 
Arab Socialist Movement.5In fact the new structure of the party dates back to the 
conference of the Arab Provisional Central Leadership (APCL) (al-Qiyada al-
Markaziya al-Arabiya al-Mu’aqata) in May 1969, and later the founding of the ASAP 
in 1970.6 
The founding of the ASAP was instrumental to the establishment of the 
Unified Arab Communist Party (UACP) (al-Hizb al-Shouyou‛i al-Arabi al-
Muwahad). The UACP would later unify the Arab working classes since it 
represented the common grounds for all Marxist-Leninist organizations across the 
Arab world.7 
 
The ASAP in Lebanon: Revolution for Change  
In Lebanon the ASAP maintained a strong relation with the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which had an important role in its formation 
(Zebian, 1977: 226). On 12 August 1972, the national conference of the ASAP was 
held and continued until the 14th. A political report was issued declaring the political 
mandate of ASAP. The report embodied important political and ideological messages 
with a clearer vision of the party’s mandate: “the conference is considered to be a new 
starting point in the process of the continuity of the party, where the ASAP is an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See p.38, political report in the party’s publications. 
5 See The Road of the Revolution(tarik al-thawra), a publication of the party, issue 1, June 1970. 
6 Political report in the party’s publications. 
7 A study from the June 1971 meeting of the Temporary Central Command Arab Meeting (Al-kiyada 
Al-Arabiya Al-Markaziya Al-Moa’kata), a political party report. 
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effective step towards the emergence of the Unified Arab Communist Party, which 
will be the unified alternative for all communist organizations and parties in the Arab 
World”.8At the same time, the party mandate endorsed the resort to revolutionary 
violence based on armed struggle, and considered this alternative as the only way for 
achieving the “Lebanese revolution”, while other alternatives such as political 
demands and protests were considered incapable of achieving change.9Thus, the 
ASAP represented the belief that revolutionary violence is the only way to stop 
feudalism and bourgeois rule.10 
 
The ASAP and the Lebanese Civil War: 
The ASAP re-established itself with new revolutionary zeal. Although a drop 
in membership levels occurred in 1972 as a result of the party’s defection of the 
Revolutionary Front from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP), 
especially in the South of Lebanon, the party retained a strong presence in Tripoli, 
Sidon, and Tyr (Zebian, 1977: 228). In 1974 the party built a strong political and 
military structure. The ASAP worked according to the rule that “every activist is a 
fighter” (kul munadel muqatel). The PFLP supplied arms and training to the ASAP 
militants. The party completed its preparations and spread its fighters in Beirut and 
throughout Lebanon on the eve of the civil war (Zebian, 1977: 229).  
The ASAP entered the civil war at its early stages and participated in many of 
its rounds. Based on its belief in revolutionary violence, the party engaged in warfare 
against what it considered to be the fascist Right wing movements, allying with the 
Palestinian resistance and the leftist National Movement (Zebian, 1977: 229). During 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Political report, the party’s publications, pp. 1, 2 and 3. 
9 Political report, the party’s publications, p. 110. 
10 Political report, the party’s publications, p. 2 
21 
 
the war the ASAP collided on a number of occasions with the National Movement; 
the latter insisted on maintaining a defensive strategy. Instead, the ASAP believed in a 
more offensive strategy vis-à-vis the right wing groups. 
Aside from its theoretical propositions on the importance of armed struggle, 
the party could not achieve what it aimed for, and remained constrained by the small 
number of militants it had to engage in both defensive and offensive battles (Zebian, 
1977: 230). Moreover, the party was also constrained by insufficient levels of military 
training. The ASAP had a strong position against the Syrian intervention in Lebanon 
and was sympathetic to Iraq. According to the leadership of the party, the 
revolutionary violence should continue, but via different and secret forms in the 
postwar period (Zebian, 1977: 231). 
 
2.5.3– The Independent Nasserite Movement (INM) 
The Independent Nasserite Movement (INM) (Harakat al-Nasiriyin al-
Mustaqilin) was one of the first parties to adopt Egyptian President Jamal Abdel-
Nasser’s principles, reflected in its “Liberty, Socialism, and Unity” slogan, under the 
presidency of Ibrahim Koleilat. The INM became a key player in politics since the 
1958 civil war when its military wing, the Mourabitoun (sentinels) clashed with 
Lebanese President Camille Cham‛oun. The movement retained a strong presence 
until the 1970s while maintaining pan-Arab ideals and strong support to the 
Palestinians in Lebanon. In the 1980s the INM engaged in battles alongside the 
Palestinians and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) against Israelis and the 
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). However, the alliance with the PSP crushed as the 
PSP joined the Amal Movement and Syria in a campaign that culminated in the exile 
of INM leader Ibrahim Koleilat and the sidelining of the Mourabitoun in 1985. 
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During the civil war, the INM was considered the main branch of the National 
Movement capable of operating in most of the conflict areas around Beirut. Albeit 
some have suggested that the PLO used the Mourabitoun as cover in Beirut since they 
enjoyed popularity in the Sunni Street, this does not seem to be the case (Zebian, 
1977: 232). Al-Mourabitoun’s popularity allowed it to be a leading party during the 
years of war. 
 
2.5.4 – The Popular Nasserite Organization (PNO) 
The Popular Nasserite Organization was a Nasserite organization established 
in Lebanon by Maarouf Saad in 1973, along with many other movements like the Free 
Nasserite Movement and the Union of the Popular Working Forces. The movement 
was mainly attributed to Maarouf Saad, who was the charismatic figure attracting the 
people of Sidon, especially as the representative of the city in the Parliament. Saad 
was considered the shadow of Nasser. He believed in pan-Arabism as a way to defend 
the Arab nation against Zionism and Imperialism. Moreover, the movement was 
considered the main populist group in Sidon (Zebian, 1977: 277).  
The PNO joined the National Movement and fought alongside it mainly in the 
Sidon area. Like other leftist parties, the PNO fought with the resistance movements 
against the Israeli Invasion in 1982. The PNO was founded and based on “Nasserism” 
as a path of struggle for unionist Lebanese parties that raised the issues of Arab Unity 
and Arabism, and adopted the Palestinian cause as a core interest (Ibid). 
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2.6– Conclusion 
Although they played an important role in Lebanese politics, the parties 
examined in this chapter are not heavy weight ones. In fact, some of them, like the 
CAO are no longer active, while others have lost their influence. In part this is due to 
the fact that they were formed under the pressure of armed struggle and thus had to 
accommodate themselves and their principles to a war-like situation. This diverted the 
parties’ priorities from social-economic struggles to revolutionary political struggles, 
and thus made it difficult for them to retool themselves into civil organization. The 
eclipse of leftist parties in Lebanon is also part and parcel of the general collapse of 
the Left in the Arab world after the 1967 defeat. 
The next two chapters examine the Progressive Socialist Party and the 
Lebanese communist Party’s experiences in Lebanon. Studying these parties allows 
for an understanding of the failures and successes of the Left in Lebanon and its 
future prospects. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE LEBANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 
 
3.1 – Introduction 
 This chapter examines one of the main leftist parties in Lebanon, the Lebanese 
Communist Party (LCP), a party commonly thought of as the first leftist party and 
“one of the oldest multi-sectarian parties in Lebanon” (Collelo, 1987). The first part 
of this chapter will present an overview of the party’s origins, evolution and decline. 
The second and third sections will highlight its main accomplishments and failures. 
 
3.2–Early Origins and Evolution 
Leftist movements in Lebanon date back to the early 1900s. On May 1907 a 
demonstration was held in the area of Raouche. In 1925 the Comintern Journal 
reported that “It is believed that the earliest May 1st celebration on Arab land took 
place in Lebanon in 1907. In that year, a group of intellectuals and students who had 
studied in Europe came back to Lebanon with socialist thoughts and held the 
celebration” (Dakroub, 2007: 100-101). They called for freedom, equality and a 
constitution among other things (Ibid: 106). According to the same journal, the 
second May 1st celebration did not take place until 1921 when some workers and 
intellectuals held a celebration that ended in a bloodbath (Ibid: 164). 
A few years later, in 1924, the “Lebanese People Party” (LPP) –which would 
later become the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon (CPSL) – was created. 
Nassib Nemr (2004) presents two accounts regarding the birth of the CPSL. The first 
suggests that Fouad Chemali met with Youssef Yazbek among other intellectuals and 
25 
 
workers11 and called for the creation of the party; the second one advances that it was 
Joseph Burger, a Jewish journalist from Palestine who visited Yazbek claiming he 
was representing the Palestinian Communist Party and was in charge of creating a 
division of the party in Lebanon. Together, they met with Chemali and other 
intellectuals and workers and launched the party (Ismael and Ismael, 1998: 7). Nemr 
claims that while some historians were under the illusion that the party was under 
Jewish control, seeing as it was founded by Jews, others only treat it as a historical 
fact (Nemr, 2004: 130).12 Be that as it may, founders of the party decided to call it the 
Lebanese People Party in an attempt to avoid the then French ban on Bolshevik 
activities (Collelo: 1987). 
 Alongside other demands, the LPP called for activating of the Lebanese 
industrial, agricultural and trade sectors; spreading a spirit of brotherhood, eliminating 
religious, sectarian and regional intolerance and banning the clergy from interfering 
with political issues; strengthening national school and making primary school 
mandatory for boys and girls; organizing workers and peasants in trade unions in 
order to defend their common interests and gain their full rights; imposing tax on 
inheritance and fortune and decreasing tax imposed on people; making public 
endowments property of the people under the government’s administration; and 
liberating women and giving them their full rights (Isamel and Ismael, 1998: 11). 
 On 30April 1925, the LPP put in an application for a license to operate as a 
political party. Once legal and public it was able to celebrate May 1st 1925 at Crystal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Elias Qashami, Artin Madoyan, Nicolas Mchantaf, Elias Mchantaf, Dr. Adib Mezher, lawyers Nemr 
Heba and Elias Jahshan, Ibrahim Estefanos, Bechara Kamel and Elias Al Hajj Nassar. 
12It is important to note that among the bibliography consulted for this study, the reference to Jewish 
founders is only emphasized by Nemr (2004) and Ismael and Ismael (1998). Dakroub (2004: 181) 
briefly mentions Burger, not as a founder but as a facilitator, without pointing out that he was Jewish. 
This raises the issue of whether the fact has been intentionally avoided or ruled out as unimportant. 
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Cinema (Ismael and Ismael, 1998: 10).  This celebration was the party’s greatest 
achievement where Youssef Yazbek, writer, reporter and founder of the LPP, 
articulated the labor demands to ban night work and impose a limit of eight hours on 
the working day and introduce legislation to establish a minimum wage and to 
establish social security insurance. He concluded his speech with Marx’s known 
phrase “Workers of the world, workers of the world, unite!” (Ibid). Among other 
things, it was one of the manifestations of the LPP’s ties to the Comintern. 
Later in 1925, members of the LPP and Spartacus, a party of Armenian 
Bolsheviks, decided to merge their parties into the Communist Party of Syria and 
Lebanon (CPSL). Even though the authorities of the French mandate had arrested tens 
of communist leaders accused of inciting the people against the system and 
supporting the Syrian revolution, detainees managed to lead the party from within 
their cells. 1926 was labeled the year of labor strikes, strikes that lead to the 
realization of most of the workers’ demands (Ibid: 397 to 399). 
In 1928 communist detainees were released as a result of a general amnesty 
for political prisoners. The party was restructured under Fouad Chemali, who became 
its Secretary General. As a result, the CPSL was linked officially to the Comintern 
(Ibid: 405 to 408). In 1929, the communists took advantage of the upcoming elections 
to disseminate their program, which was largely similar to those of the LPP in 1924. 
In July 1930 the CPSL, still a secret party at that time, decided to go public and 
openly attack the mandate, surprising the Comintern that had assumed the arrests had 
eradicated the party. 
The early 1930s witnessed prominent partisan activity whether in daily 
struggle or intellectual output all under the oppression of French authorities and a ban 
on labor or political movements  (Ibid: 427 to 431 and 448). Party activities 
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concentrated on political education among the Arab intelligentsia (Ismael and Ismael, 
1998: 21). In July 1931, the party published its first detailed program asking for the 
total independence and unity of Syria, the withdrawal of the occupying French 
armies, the end of the mandate, the cancellation of debts imposed by the Ottomans, 
the withdrawal of the privileges of foreign companies and confiscation of their 
possessions, and, finally, the abolishment of the constitution imposed by the mandate 
on the Syrian people (Ibid: 449). Unlike the previously mentioned demands focusing 
on popular needs and rights, these ones concentrated on abolishing the French 
mandate. 
In 1932, it was decided that a Palestinian Communist Party would be created, 
independent from the Syrian one. The effect of that on Lebanon was the emergence of 
a new leadership of the party by Khaled Bekdash. Consequently, more intellectuals 
were drawn to the CPSL and many its members were dedicated to political work, 
focusing on how to present to party to appeal to the public (Nemr, 2004: 63). 
The late 1930s witnessed the establishment of a multi-sectarian democratic 
pro-reform force reflecting that decade’s social struggles against monopolization of 
wealth and resources. It culminated in the Democratic National Convention held in 
November 1938 under the auspices of the CPSL. The convention condemned the 
interference of the mandate officers in ministerial work and denounced administrative 
corruption. It proposed a series of reforms including the popular election of the 
president of the republic, a ban on combining ministerial and parliamentary tasks, and 
the adoption of a direct and progressive income tax (Traboulsi, 2008: 172-173). 
The CPSL had been enjoying its public status after the victory of the National 
Front in France in 1936. Ismael and Ismael note that there was “some relaxation of 
repressive measures in Syria and Lebanon and more tolerance of the mandate 
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authorities towards communist activities” (1998: 29). But in 1939, after the start of 
the Second World War, and the surprising Nazi-Soviet agreement insuring the 
Soviet’s non-intervention, the party was declared illegal by the French mandate 
authorities and had to go back to the secretive life (Nemr, 2004: 78; and Collelo: 
1987). 
1943 was an eventful year for both the CPSL and for Lebanon. In May the 
Comintern founded by Lenin was dissolved as the Soviet Union joined the 
Allies.13The CPSL regarded this as a positive step in the evolution of world 
communism (Ismael and Ismael, 1998: 34). Nevertheless, this meant that, on the eve 
of the parliamentary elections in August 1943, the CPSL had to contest the elections 
independent of the Comintern. In fact, the CPSL candidates contested the elections 
ran as independents, outside the usual electoral lists. Their electoral plan was flexible 
and appealed on reform and the demands were democratic and moderate, but it was a 
plan that marginalized several fundamental communist concerns such as acquiring 
independence (Nemr: 2004, 124-125). According to Nemr, it also sidelined the main 
communist goal, namely revolution. In his speech, Bekdash claimed that “all we ask 
is the improvement of the conditions of the national worker” to reassure employers. 
The candidates thus entered their electoral campaign with “traditional bourgeois 
slogans” (Ismael and Ismael, 1998: 32) and failed to win any seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies (Callelo, 1987). 
In this “volatile climate, both nationally and internationally”, the CPSL held 
its first14 party congress from 31 December 1943 until 2 January 1944. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 While the Soviets claimed the decision was taken because of the widened communist movement that 
no longer can be controlled in one center, it is believed that it was the Soviet’s guarantee of no 
interference in other countries’ affairs (Nemr, 2004: 147). 
14 As discussed earlier, some consider it the second congress. 
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conference was attended by 200 delegates (Ismael and Ismael, 1998: 34). 
Orchestrated by Bekdash, the congress concluded with three main decisions: the 
division of the CPSL into the Syrian Communist Party (SCP) and the Lebanese 
Communist Party (LCP); that there should be one common Central Committee for 
both parties; and the ratification of the national program for each of the Syrian and 
Lebanese parties (Ibid: 35). 
After the end of the Second World War, the LCP launched a series of strikes 
against the mandate and established the General Union of Workers. In spite of their 
internal problems, by 1947 both the LCP and the SCP were playing “prominent roles 
in national politics and had about 18,000 members”. In addition, “union organizing 
activity expanded and about seventy trade unions had been established including 
nearly 30,000 workers in the most important sects of the economy” (Ibid: 38). 
Nevertheless, LCP candidates were defeated again in the 1947 parliamentary elections 
(Collelo, 1987). 
According to Ismael and Ismael, the party reached the peak of its influence in 
Lebanese politics in 1948. Quoting Walter Laqueur, they suggest that the LCP had 
become “one of the strongest parties in the country” (1998: 38). However, this high 
point soon collapsed in the light of the party’s position on the partition of Palestine. 
Khaled Bekdash shifted drastically the party’s position to accommodate the Soviet 
policy, even though the LCP had been strictly against the partition. This resulted in 
internal conflicts leading to a dramatic decrease in the party’s membership due to the 
expulsion of dissidents and the mass withdrawals, in addition to a significant loss of 
public support. Consequently, the Central Committee decided to reunify the Syrian 
and Lebanese parties in August 1950 (Ibid: 39-40). 
From then on, ties to the SCP became stronger to the point where, in 1954, the 
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party leadership was moved to Damascus. In Artin Madoyan’s view, this decision 
damaged the already fragile party (Ibid: 45). The unification ended in November 1958 
and the LCP and SCP were separated again. Thus, during the 1950s, the party's 
inconsistent policies on different levels cost it support and eventually isolated it and 
pushed it back to underground work (Collelo: 1987). 
It was not until 1965 that the LCP moved towards ending its isolation. Early 
that year, as Nicolas Chawi was elected Secretary General replacing Khaled Bekdash, 
the LCP became officially independent of the SCP. According to George Batal, the 
LCP took some drastic regulatory measures, carried out a deep and comprehensive 
correction of the party’s policies and also reconsidered its alliances with democratic 
and national forces (Edde, 2005: 51-52). As a result, the LCP started reaching out to 
Arab nationalists, which was the first step towards the long-term alliance with the 
Arab Nationalist Movements (Ibid: 53). In addition, communication with the PSP 
resumed and the LCP became a member of the Front of National and Progressive 
Parties and Forces, which later became the Lebanese National Movement (Collelo, 
1987). In August that year, the LCP, along with the PSP and the Arab Nationalist 
Movement, called for a popular gathering in support of the farmers’ struggle against 
trade monopoly (Traboulsi, 2008: 254). 
Despite this seeming success, the party was preoccupied conflicts within its 
ranks, which were aggravated by the humiliating Arab defeat in 1967 (Ismael and 
Ismael, 1998: 81). The severe internal crisis visibly manifested itself during second 
congress held in 1968. There were then two distinct visions and approaches: one that 
longed for more independence from the Soviet Union and another that called for 
maintaining party ties with Moscow. Accordingly, for some members, the congress 
was considered historic as it was able to draw goals, formulate policies and make 
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political alliances, independent from the wishes of the “infallible authority”, the 
Soviet Union (Batal in Edde, 2005: 57). For others, the congress was taken over by 
some opportunists who had appropriated some ideas as their own, and whose aim was 
the total distortion of communism (Nemr, 2004: 11-12). The former camp was able to 
attain its objective as the party was restructured radically (Murad in Edde, 2005: 30), 
and according to Ismael and Ismael, “the party showed great vigor in recruiting new 
members, particularly among youth” (1998: 81). 
Shortly after that, in 1970, and while communist parties in other Arab 
countries were still banned by their respective governments, the LCP regained legal 
status from then Minister of Interior Kamal Junblat (Ismael and Ismael, 1998: 81), 
and the call to join the party turned public (Ashti, 2004: 58). Meanwhile, efforts were 
spent on two levels: preparations for the third congress, and the establishment of the 
Popular Guard (al-Haras al-Sha‛by), the party’s military wing. 
Held on schedule for the first time, the third congress convened in January 
1972, four years after the second one. It was largely considered as continuation and 
development of the earlier congress (Batal in Edde, 2005: 66), and presented a serious 
attempt by the party to become a meaningful political force in the region as it 
struggled to overcome the traditional communist ghetto of isolation and sectarianism 
and to make a strong, convincing appeal to the Arab public (Ismael and Ismael, 1998: 
82). That year several LCP leaders, including its Secretary General, publically ran for 
the elections. But even though they polled several thousands of votes, none of them 
succeeded in claiming a seat (Collelo, 1987).  
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3.3 – The LCP’s Military Engagement and Decline 
The LCP started preparing military cadres in order to protect itself and the 
Palestinians from two looming dangers: that of the Phalange Party and its allies in the 
Lebanese Front (LF) and that of Israeli attacks. Nonetheless, along with its allies, the 
party launched political initiatives in order to find a political solution under the slogan 
of democratic change (Batal in Edde, 2005: 62). However, on the eve of the civil war, 
the Popular Guard was actively fighting alongside its allies in the LNM (Collelo, 
1987) against the LF in what has come to be known as “the Two Years War” (Harb 
al-Sanatayn) (Traboulsi, 2008: 329-330), which ended with the assassination of 
Kamal Junblat in April 1977 (Ibid: 255). 
The LCP’s fourth congress was held in 1979, three years late because of the 
war. During that congress, George Hawi was elected Secretary General and some 
major changes were introduced to the structure of the party. Ten comrades were 
assigned as members of the Politburo leaving the LCP under a collective leadership. 
Moreover, a secretariat office was assigned to overlook the execution of decisions. 
However, according to Batal, this led to the marginalization of the Politburo and, 
contrary to what was intended, turned the secretariat – under the leadership of the 
Secretary General – into the leading force of the party (Edde: 2005, 86-87). 
Despite the LCP’s internal conflicts, the decision to resist the 1982 Israeli 
invasion was largely a collective decision (Charbel, 2005: 69-70). In September 1982, 
the LCP created the Lebanese National Resistance Front (Jabhat al-Muqawama al-
Wataniya al-Lubnaniya) (Traboulsi, 2008: 387), a topic examined in details in chapter 
5, proving itself a major player at a historical turning point (Murad in Edde, 2005: 
30). In addition to fighting the Israeli army, the LCP also initiated a fight against 
Multi-National Forces as soon as those started supporting Israeli troops (Batal in 
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Edde, 2005: 93-94). 
Once more, the war had delayed the party’s congress. Its fifth congress was 
held in February 1987, eight years after the fourth one. It confirmed, yet again, the 
conflicts within that party, and aggravated its incessant crisis (Ibid: 102-103). Also in 
that year, along with the PSP, the LCP fought a weeklong battle with Amal militants, 
a conflict that was stopped by Syrian troops. Worthy of note is that, during the mid-
1980s, many party leaders and members were assassinated, reportedly by Islamic 
fundamentalists (Collelo, 1987). 
For the LCP, the fact that it was the foreign interference that ended the civil 
war meant the defeat of the project of democratic forces. That, in addition to the fall 
of the Soviet Union, deepened the party’s crisis (Batal in Edde, 2005: 102-103). 
Under these circumstances, the sixth congress was held in May 1992 and deep 
differences came to light. According to Batal, the political document that came out 
(al-wathiqa) presented advancement and regeneration in thought, politics, methods of 
work and internal democracy. But when it comes to the party itself it did not meet the 
ambitions of Hawi (Edde: 104). Few months later, in September 1992, Hawi 
submitted his resignation and was replaced by Farouq Dahrouj (Edde, 2005: 182). 
Thus, since the early 1990s, the crisis kept intensifying and persisted during 
the following congresses. The ninth congress, held in December 2003, and where 
Khaled Hadadi was elected Secretary General marked the rupture of communists 
according to Batal. In fact, Hadadi asserted that the rupture not only was within the 
party, but also with the people: “we are alienated from our people” (Edde, 2005: 111). 
This was confirmed in the elections of the year 2000 where the LCP failed on both 
levels: they failed internally to agree on the elections and failed to gain votes. 
Internally, there was a strong disagreement regarding how the elections were handled 
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and how the candidates were chosen (Ashti, 2004: 298). This disagreement even 
produced counter-nominations: some communists nominated themselves against the 
candidates officially nominated by the party (Ibid: 300). Moreover, the LCP remained 
outside the major electoral lists and was thus unable to win any seats (Ibid: 281). 
The situation has not changed in recent years, and the LCP seems to have 
become stagnant. The party’s activities are limited to May Day celebrations, attended 
by a few hundreds of people, in addition to more failed election results in 2005 and 
2009. 
 
3.4– The LCP’s Accomplishments 
Although the LCP’s influence has been declining over the years, the party 
achieved several feats that have had lasting impact on Lebanese politics. In this 
section, four of the LCP’s major achievements will be highlighted. These are 
promoting the concept of secularism, developing the trade union movement, 
establishing the concept of resistance to Israelis, and strengthening media, cultural 
and artistic work. 
 
3.4.1 – The Concept of Secularism 
The LCP has always been a secular party, and one of the few parties that have 
affiliations throughout different sects and regions in Lebanon (Batal in Edde: 2005, 
93; Collelo, 1987). In fact, secularism was one of the party’s key struggles –if not the 
main one– that started with the LPP and continues today. The LPP’s principles called 
for eliminating all forms of religious and sectarian fanaticism and banning the clergy 
from interfering with political issues (Dakroub, 2007: 342). 
These are recurrent demands in the LCP’s statements and activities. The 
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current rules of procedure (al-nizam al-dakhili) of the party, like previous ones, 
highlight that the LCP aims at abolishing the sectarian system and replacing it with a 
democratic, secular and civil one. 15 Along the same lines, the LCP’s leader Khaled 
Hadadi recently called for political reform based on the abolition of political 
sectarianism.16 The LCP also was a major contributor to the Campaign for Abolishing 
the Sectarian System (Hamlat Isqat al-Nizam al-Ta’ifi) in 2011. 
This is not to say that it was a concept unknown to the Lebanese, but to point 
out that it was the LCP that brought it to light, implemented it within the party and 
attempted to apply it to Lebanon. One of these attempts appears in the statement of 
former PM Rashid El Solh on the eve of the civil war. The statement, to which LCP 
leader George Hawi had contributed largely, revolved around the idea that the 
sectarian dominance cannot continue and that political sectarianism should be 
abolished and replaced by a secular democratic system (Charbel, 2005: 83-84). 
Throughout the years and up until today, anti-sectarian slogans have been 
raised by the LCP and it is important to note that it was the LCP that has rooted the 
concept of secularism in the Lebanese society. Nowadays sectarianism is an offense 
that none would want to be guilty of and it is the LCP that first carried the banner of 
secularism, and continues to do so today. Leaders of sects call for abolishing 
sectarianism, an obvious shift from their past speeches, regardless of whether it is a 
genuine call. 
Another important point to note is that, while abolishing sectarianism was not 
mentioned in the Lebanese constitution, it was later on noted in the Ta’ef Agreement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Article 3, “Principles and Objectives,” retrieved from, 
<http://www.sawtakonline.com/forum/showthread.php?12010-مﻡﺎﻈﻨﻟاﺍ-ﻲﻠﺧاﺍﺪﻟاﺍ-بﺏﺰﺤﻠﻟ-ﻲﻋﻮﯿﻴﺸﻟاﺍ-ﻲﻧﺎﻨﺒﻠﻟاﺍ>. 
16 Speech made by Hadadi in 2009, retrieved from 
<http://www.jammoul.net/forum/showthread.php?t=12012>. 
36 
 
as an objective, although it is still not implemented today. 
 
3.4.2– The Trade Union Movement 
Establishing trade unions has also been a fundamental aspect of the LCP’s 
work. In fact, the LPP had called for organizing trade unions for workers and peasants 
in an attempt to defend their interests and insure their full rights (Dakroub, 2007: 
342). Dakroub refers to several successful experiences among which that of the 
communist printing workers who were able to re-establish their union in 1926, which 
then became very influential and was able to fulfill many of the workers’ demands 
(2007: 335). 
The LCP allocated a significant amount of its activities in order to form trade 
unions and regulate the relations between them with the aim of uniting the trade union 
movement in a General Union (Ibid: 301). The General Union of Workers (GUW) 
and Employees in Lebanon (the Labor Union) was indeed founded in the mid-1940s 
after the Second World War, by Mustafa Al-Ariss, and became influential in the 
country’s political life (Ismael and Ismael, 1998: 38). “The GUW was responsible for 
enacting the first progressive labour legislation in the Arab World, the Lebanese 
Labour Act of 1946. It was affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions and 
attended the federation’s Paris conference in 1945”, and, by 1947, seventy trade 
unions had been established (Ibid). 
Thus, even though the political trait remains the party’s central feature, for the 
LCP, trade union work is a key and central issue that had its positive returns for the 
party and for the country. On the one hand, it helped the labor wing of the party and 
helped underscore the main difference between the LCP, the party of the working 
class, and other national parties (Dakroub, 2007: 302). On the other hand, it helped 
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improve the work conditions of labor: eight working hours a day, a ban on night 
work, and fixing the minimum wage, were all demands of the LPP on May Day 1925 
(Ibid: 303-304). 
The LCP not only played a major role in establishing and developing Trade 
Unions in Lebanon, it also attempted to educate the people about the importance of 
these Trade Unions. The LPP allocated a part of its publications “Humanity”, to 
publish articles under the title of “the Life of Unions” (Hayat al-Naqabat) that would 
discuss the establishment and organization of unions, as well as the rights and 
obligations of workers towards their unions, among other things (Ibid: 332). 
The LCP’s work in Trade Unions translated into different successful 
accomplishments. In 1965, the law for social security was put in place and one year 
later, the National Union of Workers and Employees’ Union (al-Ittihad al-Watanili-
naqabat al-‛ummalwal-mustakhdamin) was licensed, followed by the establishment of 
the General Union of Workers in Lebanon in 1970. Between 1972 and 1974 the 
Union was immersed in supporting the struggles of farmers and peasants. The Union 
was able to lead a march of more than 30000 farmers in May 1974 (Ghazal, 2005). 
This prominent Trade Unions’ work was however ceased on the eve of the 
civil war, although in 1988 protests were organized in all regions and demarcation 
lines were crossed. After the end of the civil war, the union movement declined even 
more and was taken over by sectarian forces. The role of unions has since become 
weak, unable to overcome sectarian quotas (Ibid). Thus, when the LCP had the 
command over trade unions, they managed to achieve several important 
accomplishments, however, when the LCP’s power declined and sectarian parties 
took over, unions are struggling to survive. This shows the significant role the LCP 
had been playing in the union movement. 
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3.4.3–Resistance 
The LCP is also the founder of the ideology of resistance in Lebanon. At the 
present time, the concept of resistance is wrongly attributed to Hezbollah. Charbel 
rightfully notes that what we are witnessing with Hezbollah is a continuation of the 
resistance mode (Halat al-Muqawama) initiated by the LCP (2005: 27). In fact, the 
LCP’s resistance state is not limited to armed confrontation with the enemy, but also 
includes intellectual and political resistance. In this respect, intellectuals and artists 
affiliated with the LCP have produced books, songs, plays promoting the concept of 
resistance among the people and calling for freedom and independence. 
 During the mandate years, the LCP fought constantly the French authorities in 
pursuit of the country’s independence. Even when the LCP’s leaders were detained 
between 1926 and 1928, they were able to lead the party from their prison cells, 
managed to mobilize prisoners, and were capable of producing journals and books 
(Dakroub, 2007: 397). Thus, the LCP’s resistance against the ‘enemy’ started 
manifesting itself as early as the party’s inception. 
As soon as the Israeli troops invaded Lebanon in 1982, the LCP turned all of 
its efforts into fighting Israel, this time physically however. Once there was a threat of 
occupation, armed resistance was given priority, and, in 16 September 1982, the 
party, along with other parties, initiated the Lebanese National Resistance Front 
(Traboulsi, 2008: 378). Batal describes the LCP’s military operations as “clean”, 
meaning that they targeted the enemy without exposing the interest of the people and 
managed to inure major losses to the Israelis (Edde, 2005: 93). The LCP did not only 
fight Israeli troops, but also the South Lebanon Army and Multi-National Forces 
when they started supporting Israelis (Batal in Edde, 2005: 93-94). 
Throughout the years, resistance was a recurrent theme that the party stressed. 
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The LCP’s leaders’ speeches on the commemoration of the Lebanese National 
Resistance Front for example reflect the great emphasis the party puts on resisting the 
enemy and liberating the land. In one of his speeches,17 Hawi asserts that Sheb‛a 
Farms should be liberated and stresses the need for liberation while referring to the 
LCP as the “Liberation Party”. More recently, on the same occasion, Hadadi wrote an 
article18 that he concluded by advancing that protecting the bread loaf and protecting 
the resistance and the nation are one battle. 
Hence, even though the LCP has fallen behind when it comes to resistance, at 
both the intellectual-political and military levels, for different reasons, this does not 
change the fact that it had established the corner stone for the concept of resistance 
and it remain an essential part of it  (Charbel, 2005: 27). 
 
3.4.4 – Strengthening Media and Cultural Work 
Since its inception, the LCP has initiated, encouraged and nurtured media and 
cultural activity. A lot of nationalist democratic revolutionary intellectuals19 
accompanied the party’s journey whether as party members or supporters. According 
to Dakroub, the journals and books published under the LCP’s supervision are 
probably the most important part of modern progressive socialist Arab thought, and 
an important part of Arab culture in general (2007: 216). 
 Al-Sahafi al-Ta’ih (the Wandering Journalist newspaper), first published in 
September 1922, “is considered to have laid the intellectual foundation for leftist 
thought, which in turn produced the organizational basis for Lebanon's early socialist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Video of the speech posted on youtube, at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h8zBokpoJQ4>. 
18Retrieved from <http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=230615>. 
19Dakroub names Amin Al-Rihani, Maroun Abboud, Ra’ifKhoury, Mikhael Neaimeh, Salim Khayata, 
Toufic Youssef Awwad, George Hanna and Omar Fakhoury (2007: 219-220-221). 
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movement, including Marxism and communism” (Ismael and Ismael, 1998: 5). 
 Al-Insaniya (Humanity) represents the first official Arab communist weekly 
newspaper. It was closed down only after five weeks of its founding (Dakroub, 2007: 
217). However, this did not affect the party’s determination. Fouad Chemali then 
started Sawt al-‛ummal (the Voice of Workers), a weekly newspaper that was 
published for four weeks. The LCP managed to keep publishing Al-Fajr al-Ahmar 
(the Red Dawn), a clandestine newsletter initiated in 1931, despite security efforts to 
stop it. It became an important medium for the coordination of labor activism. Then in 
1934 the party acquired Al-Douhour newspaper (the Ages) that was closed down a 
year later and replaced by Al-Tali‛ah (the Vanguard). Later, in 1937, Sawt al-Sha‛b 
(Voice of People) was issued for ten years before it was closed down. In the 1950s, 
the LCP acquired Al-Sarkha (the Shout) and Al-Akhbar (the News) newspapers. A 
clandestine party circular, Nida’ al-Sha‛b (Call of the People), was also published 
(Ismael and Ismael, 1998: 16-17-21-29-31-44; and Dakroub, 2007: 218-219). 
Even during civil war years, and while undertaking resistance operations, the 
LCP kept working on this cultural level and created Sawt al-Sha‛b (Voice of the 
People)radio station and Al-Jadeed TV station  (Batal in Edde, 2005: 102-103). 
 This brief overview of the cultural productions and activity of the LCP, in 
addition to the hundreds of books published by its own publishing house, Al-Farabi, 
clearly highlights the emphasis the party puts on media and intellectual work, which 
are great contributions to the Arab progressive thought. Worthy of note is that, the 
Soviet Union’s material aid, such as paper for example, helped the LCP produce more 
newspapers, magazine and books than other parties (Ashti, 2004: 348-349). 
 Thus, there was a clear mutual influence between the LCP and some of the 
most prominent intellectuals. Many of the Lebanese writers, poets and artists working 
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during the 1960s and 1970s were strongly tied to the LCP, some of them as comrades, 
other as friends (Dakroub, 2007: 221). Amin El Rihani, Maroun Abboud, Ra’if 
Khoury, Mikhael N‛aimeh, Salim Khayata, Tawfiq Youssuf Awwad, George Hanna 
and Omar Fakhoury are acknowledged intellectuals and writers who contributed to 
the publications of the LCP (Ibid: 219 to 221).Ziad Rahbani, Marcel Khalife,Khaled 
El Habr, Sami Hawat and Ahmad Qa‛bour are renowned communist or ex-communist 
musicians and composers who still enjoy wide popularity. Also among the 
intellectuals and artists that influenced and were influenced by the LCP Karim 
Dakroub (theatre), Asaad Said (zajal), Issam Abdallah (poet), Shawqi Bzay‛ (poet), 
Mehdi Amel (writer) and Karim Mrouwe (writer). 
 
3.5–The LCP’s Mistakes 
In addition to the achievements of the LCP there were also failures on 
different levels. These have largely weakened its internal structure and affected its 
relation with the people. This section will outline four of the party’s major failures: its 
involvement in the Lebanese civil war and its sectarian dimensions, the 
marginalization of socio-economic issues, its inability to avoid ideological paralysis, 
and the lack of internal democracy in the party. 
3.5.1 – Subordination to the Comintern 
In June 1928 the CPSL was officially incorporated into the Comintern 
(Dakroub, 2007: 408). The latter had an active – and sometimes decisive – impact on 
communist parties in the world, and Lebanon was no exception. This did not apply 
only to critical decisions, but to such acts as a self-censorship by intellectuals who 
relied on theories of the international communist movement for fear of committing 
“intellectual and practical” errors (Ibid: 53). 
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One early manifestation of the LCP’s subordination to the Comintern took 
place in 1947 regarding the partition of Palestine. The party had always supported the 
Palestinian peoples in their struggle against Zionism, and had rejected partition. In 
fact, ten days prior to the Soviet vote in support of partition in October 1947, Sawt al-
Shaab, the LCP’s newspaper declared that “the solution to the Palestine question is 
withdrawal [of British forces], independence, abolishment of the mandate, and 
unequivocal rejection of partition”. However, after the Soviet vote, Bekdash shifted 
radically the party’s position to accommodate Soviet policy. This resulted in severe 
internal party conflicts (Isamel and Ismael, 1998: 38-39). 
 After the Comintern was abolished during the Second World War, the LCP 
claimed its independence. However, when the Soviet-Chinese conflict erupted, the 
LCP sided with the Soviet Union and its Marxist-Leninist approach against China and 
its Maoist approach. Thus subordination to an international body, the Comintern, was 
replaced with subordination to a country, an even more dangerous choice (Nemr, 
2004: 148). Some members of the LCP were even “accused” of being “Maoists 
deviationists” and were expelled from the party. 
Hawi was elected Secretary General of the LCP in 1977. He was critical of the 
party’s ideological stalemate and argued that Marxism should only be considered as a 
method or a guide for action (Edde, 2005: 11). However even when Hawi was leading 
the party, the LCP still adopted a Leninist approach (Ashti, 2004: 48). For example, 
albeit party members opposed the LCP’s participation in the civil war, Hawi’s 
decisions were nevertheless implemented. 
It was only after the fall of the Soviet Union that some changes took effect: 
there was more flexibility with membership, discipline, members’ rights and the 
organizational principles (Ibid). For instance, at the organizational level, the sixth 
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congress held in 1992 amended the rules of procedure allowing more internal 
democracy, diversity and respect of different opinions, as well as more debate before 
taking any decisions. It also allowed those with opposing opinions the chance to voice 
them and try to convince others, however only after abiding by the party’s decisions. 
The binding relations between the LCP and the Comintern were the reason for 
the ideological stalemate that the party suffered from. This affected practical 
decisions as well as the party’s intellectual productivity, thus causing a gap within the 
party and a gap between the party and the people. The LCP was not able to take its 
own decisions based on the circumstances in Lebanon. As a result, people were not 
able to relate to it. 
 
3.5.2 – The LCP’s Involvement in the Civil War 
The LCP’s involvement in the civil war is without doubt one of its chief 
failures. Although the party reportedly tried to avoid the conflict, it soon found itself 
immersed in the war and drawn into its sectarian dimensions. 
 In an interview conducted with him, George Hawi claimed that the LCP’s 
participation, and that of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party helped give the war a 
national dimension rather than a purely sectarian one (Charbel, 2005: 35). Yet the 
LCP’s participation could not stop the war from taking sectarian detours. Hawi 
himself speaks of the uncontrollable sectarian reactions during the war. In the 
Mountain war for example, Israel fomented sectarian massacres. The horrible killings 
and displacement of Druze by the Lebanese Forces and the chaos resulting from the 
lack of discipline in the ranks of the forces fighting with the LNM are reasons why it 
was impossible to avoid sectarian conflicts (Ibid). This not only proves that the LCP’s 
participation did not ease sectarian hatreds; it also suggests that the party, at some 
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point, justified sectarian massacres. Even if, at the beginning of the war, the LCP 
considered itself participating in a national struggle, soon this did not stop the war 
from sliding into a sectarian conflict. 
 At some points during the years of the civil war, the LCP engaged in sectarian 
alliances. For instance, in the early 1980s, the LCP and other leftist parties allied with 
Amal movement, and sectarian figures like Rashid Karami and Suleiman Franjyeh 
under the National Salvation Front (Jabhatal-Inqaz al-Watani) (Traboulsi, 2008: 
391). The front however did not last long because it was sponsored by Syria that was 
trying to find sectarian solutions according to Batal (in Edde, 2005: 95-96). Similar 
sectarian alliances have given the party a sectarian aspect. Hawi advances that having 
a lot of Muslim figures allied with the leftist parties, made it look as if those parties 
were allied with Muslims against Christians (Edde, 2005: 157).  
 The LCP frequently found itself immersed in conflicts that it did not want to 
participate in. The clash with Syria is one example. The Syrian regime was favorable 
position to the Lebanese Front and against the Lebanese National Movement during 
the war, it wanted to end armed conflict and implement sectarian policy. On the other 
hand, Junblat was asking for the Syrian help to eradicate extreme right to implement 
reform and decided to clash with Syria because of its position. The LCP was against 
this clash with Syria, but had to abide by the decisions of its strongest ally, the PSP 
(Charbel, 2005: 98 to 102). 
Another example is the eradication of al-Mourabitoun party: Hawi confessed 
that the LCP was against this decision but had to go through with it along with Walid 
Junblat (Ibid: 53). This demonstrates that decisions taken during the civil war were 
not always –if at all– aligned with the LCP’s views. The LCP participated in a 
sectarian war, but could not even take its own decisions. 
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 It is essential to note that the LCP had several reasons for getting involved in 
the war, most importantly to avoid a victory of those political parties supported by 
Israel. Preserving Lebanon’s Arab identity is actually one of the LPC’s principles. 
However, a lot of mistakes were made and many times the party relied on its 
aspirations instead of the facts as its leaders thought they could master the “game” 
(Hawi in Charbel, 2005: 88). 
 
3.5.3 – The Marginalization of Socio-Economic Issues  
The fact that the LCP was involved in the war for so many years undoubtedly 
led to the marginalization of its social and economic agenda. Although a consequence 
of the LCP’s participation in the civil war, it was one of the party’s weaknesses. 
 As previously highlighted in this chapter, when it was first initiated, the 
party’s main focus was on the socio-economic rights of workers mainly through trade 
unions. However, this ceased to be the main concern later on. As already stated, 
during the 1940s, the LCP focused less on its main principles, but especially socio-
economic reforms, and was accused of having shifted from being a revolutionary to a 
barely reformist party (Nemr, 2004: 125). 
 Later, during the civil war years, there was no room left for social and 
economic demands, even though Batal claims that, despite the fighting, social and 
economic issues were still of concern to the LCP (Edde, 2005: 93-94). Nonetheless, 
this concern is not evident. Batal himself admits that, while the communists wanted 
reform through politics and feared that the military wing of the party would be the 
central focus once at war, militarization took over, marginalizing other aspects of the 
LCP, namely its social and economic agenda. 
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In fact, an overview of some of the main turning points of the party clearly 
shows the marginalization of socio-economic demands. In the 1920s, the LPP had for 
several demands, on the top of which the activation of the Lebanese industrial, 
agricultural and trade sectors, as well as strengthening national schools, among other 
things. In the 1930s the demands published in the party’s program concentrated on 
abolishing the French mandate. In the 1940s, after the division the CPSL, both the 
LCP and the SCP were concentrating on socio-economic work through focusing on 
trade unions. This work continued and culminated in the establishment of the General 
Union of Workers in Lebanon in 1970, but started declining at the eve of the civil war 
where socio-economic demands were marginalized in favor of military engagement. 
 The inescapable correlation between the political, the social and the economic 
has been pointed out by many (Nahas in Sadek, 2001: 299). Even though this 
correlation is not unknown to the LCP’s leaders, who founded the party hoping that 
social and economic reforms would lead to political reform, it seems that the party has 
disregarded this correlation at many instances, whether deliberately or for reasons 
outside of its control. Thus, after the civil war where military work was given priority, 
it was difficult for the LCP to re-engage itself with socio-economic work. It lost 
influence on the level of trade unions, and has been failing to take back the lead on 
socio-economic reform (Dakroub, 2007: 100-101-106- and Ismael and Ismael, 1998: 
11-21-34-35-38-81). 
 
 
 
3.5.4 – Lack of Internal Party Democracy  
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Very much related to the previous point is the fact that the party has mainly 
been led by a dictator-leader and has always suffered from internal conflicts reflecting 
its ideological deadlock. Nemr suggests that the Soviet system of government turned 
the leader of the party into an infallible dictator (2004: 172). Similarly, Edde argues 
that in the Soviet experience, the party replaced the people, the party leadership 
replaced the party, and the Secretary General replaced the party leadership (2005: 11). 
Although critical of this aspect of the Soviet model, the Lebanese model is actually 
not very different: Khaled Bekdash remained Secretary General until his death for a 
total of 58 years. But this dictatorial title is not only the result of the long years as 
Secretary General but also of the practices of Bekdash who expelled members, not 
only dissidents but also those he claimed have connections with the Security forces, 
like Fouad Chemali, one of the party’s founders (Ismael and Ismael, 1998: 20). 
Bekdash’s style is described as an “authoritarian and semi-Stalinist style of control 
over the part” (Ibid: 64). 
 Bekdash is not the only Secretary General who remained in this position for a 
long period, however. Even those who followed remained in their position for long 
years: George Hawi and Farouq Dahrouj were Secretary Generals for 15 and 11 years 
respectively, and Khaled Hadadi has been Secretary General for 9 years so far. 
 As aforementioned, internal conflicts were unremitting within the LCP. 
Throughout the years many members have chosen to leave the party and start other 
parties that would fit their visions. The internal differences appear very explicitly in 
the literature, where accounts of similar events are given different interpretations. For 
example, while Batal praises Hawi’s input in the second congress and points to those 
who did not support Hawi as fundamentalists blindly aligned with the Soviet Union 
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(Edde, 2005: 57), Nemr refers to Hawi and his followers as opportunists who are 
distorting communism and longing for tribal rule (2004: 12). 
 Several issues were at the core of growing alienation within the LCP, namely 
the relationship with the Soviet Union, the relationship between the Arab national 
liberation movement, the role of the petty bourgeoisie in the national liberation 
movement, and the authoritarian versus democratic practice (Ismael and Ismael, 1998: 
64). Consequently, several communists had left the LCP throughout the years, 
expelled or by choice. In 1964, a number of party members, led by Edmund Aoun, 
Nakhlah Mutran, Suhail Yamot and others, formally asked the leadership to hold a 
congress, as they wanted to question the party leadership on its policies and its 
failings. Their request was denied; they were accused of being Maoist deviationists, 
suspended from the party, and a year later, expelled (Ibid: 64-65). Other groups 
followed. Between 1965 and 1967 some of those who left the LCP have initiated the 
Communist Action Organization (Charbel, 2005: 143). 
 Nemr, who is actually a member of a group that walked out of the party in 
protest of the authoritarian leadership and stagnation, argues that the LCP suffered 
from a wrong understanding of democratic centralism (al-Markaziya al-Dimuqratiya) 
making the leadership always right and the base always wrong even when right which 
resulted in dictatorship and internal conflicts (2004: 36).This group of “reformists” 
referred to “traditional communists” as “the communist[s] who adopted communist, 
literally, and not in concept”, an expression they borrowed from Lenin. 
 
3.6 – Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to highlight the LCP’s origins and evolution, as well as 
its main strengths and weaknesses. It is important to note that the weaknesses referred 
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to seem to match some of the reasons that have led to the failure of the Soviet Union 
model. According to the LCP’s sixth congress the reasons of the Soviet Union’s 
failures are: first, a wrong economic vision; second, the lack of democracy; third, the 
neglect of the national factor in determining the future of individuals and the 
community; fourth, the arbitrary denial of the role of spiritual factors in the life of 
individuals and community; and finally, the closed nature of the undemocratic 
bureaucratic party (Batal in Edde, 2004: 106). The points addressed in fact apply to 
the Lebanese model. The LCP succeeded to point out weaknesses but was unable to 
avoid them. 
The next chapter looks at another influential party in Lebanon labeled as 
leftist, the Progressive Socialist Party founded by Kamal Junblat. Similarly, the 
chapter first looks at the party’s founding and evolution then emphasizes its main 
achievements and failures. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY 
 
4. 1 – Introduction  
The principles of the PSP derive from socialist ideas and reform experiences 
from around the world (Timoviv, 2000: 172-175). Even though the party is called 
“socialist”, its principles, according to its founder, do not blindly adopt all Socialism’s 
philosophical ideas. According to Kamal Junblat, the PSP’s socialism is not a rigid 
copy of Marx and Engels’ dogma applied by International Communism. Instead, the 
party embraces some of Socialism’s economic and social approaches but rejects many 
of its assertions (Junblat, 2004: 12 and13).  
The PSP is an exceptional “leftist movement” founded by a leader whom was 
a descendant of a feudal family, Kamal Junblat. This blend has put the party under the 
actions of what could be called feudal socialism (Timoviv, 2000: 206). It is important 
to note that the history and ideology of the PSP is largely based on its founder, Kamal 
Junblat, and later on his son Walid. Thus the overview of the party undertaken in this 
chapter will be conveyed through their lives. 
The chapter opens with a discussion of the origins of the PSP and its 
evolution. It then examines the party’s main strengths and weaknesses within the 
frame of the Lebanese Left. 
 
4.2 – Origins and Evolution 
Kamal Junblat, the only successor to the Junblat family had a spiritual and 
intellectual nature that his closest family members could rarely understand (Timoviv, 
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2000:150-151). He began his undergraduate studies in France specializing in Law at 
the Sorbonne University. The year (1937-1938) he spent in France affected his leftist 
tendencies given that during his stay, the French Popular Front was still in power and 
the labor and leftist movements were at their peaks and socialist notions were very 
popular amongst the masses (Rihana, 2007[volume 2]: 19-20). 
After his return from France a clash between his socialist ideas and feudalist 
uprising surfaced. A conflict of interest between Junblat and his powerful mother 
Nazira emerged (Timoviv, 2000:120-121). In 1942, the corruption of state officials and 
the deterioration of the economic situation in Lebanon affected the lower class. Given 
his socialist principles, Junblat could not accept the unjust measures taken by the 
authorities (Timoviv, 2000: 86). He established a consumer association that bought 
wheat from Syria and Palestine and established, in Mokhtara,20 a chemical laboratory to 
extract the caustic soda electrolysis to secure soap making supplies (Rihana, 2007 
[volume 1]: 39). 
 On 5 June 1943, Junblat was declared successor to his family’s feudal 
leadership and one of the political leaders of the Druze sect in Lebanon (Rihana, 
2007[volume 1]: 40). Historically, the Junblat family allied with the powers of the day, 
whether the French when Lebanon was under its colonial control or the President and 
the ruling Lebanese bourgeoisie after independence (Timoviv, 2000:92). Junblat won in 
the 1943 parliamentary elections running on the same electoral list with the traditional 
Maronite allies21of the Junblat family. After Bechara El-Khoury was voted as president, 
Junblat’s political stances started to deviate from that of his mother. He soon opposed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Mokhtara is the ancestral Palace of the Junblat family. 
21 Emile Edde was a Maronite leaders allied to the France. 
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his blocs’ policies, and allied with their rivals,22 who were calling for more concessions 
from the French, demanding the complete independence of Lebanon from France 
(Timoviv, 2000:101-103). 
Between 1944 and 1949 Kamal Junblat allied with traditional political leaders 
but did not participate in their political targets of position building for personal benefits. 
His socialist beliefs and actions were highlighted in almost all of his actions as minister 
and as Member of Parliament. In 1944 Junblat voiced his belief that the government 
should start emphasizing reforming economy, and proposed his vision in this regard. 
His reform vision was based on three main principles derived from that of Marxist 
economic principles. First, prioritizing the economy in the course of building a strong 
state. Second, the country’s income should return to the state as an institution rather 
than the political authorities’ personal interests. Third, organizing a planned economy 
that enables the government to mobilize state resources and spend according to the 
economic goals of the country. This also involved reducing the income gaps between 
the rich and the poor. Junblat believed that the only solution for this lies in the 
redistribution of social wealth, which would give workers and farmers the right to own 
properties (Timoviv, 2000:107-108-113). He also believed that for the country to be 
completely independent the hegemony of sectarian interests should be ended and the 
public interest should be given procedure over sectarian ones. 
At the end of 1946 Kamal Junblat formed with other members of the 
parliament23 a “reform bloc” to oppose the current government system and presidential 
policies.24 He was soon appointed minister of economy from where he tried to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 President Bechara El-Khoury, Minister Camile Chamoun, and MP Saeb Salam. 
23 Notably, Abdel Hamid Karami a powerful Sunni politician from Tripoli, Alfred Naccache, Henry 
Faroun, Camile Chamoun. 
24 President Bechara El-Khoury. 
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implement his reforms (Safi 2006: 58 and 59). His biographer, Eigor Timoviv, asserts 
that Junblat was particularly strict with the Druzes working with him in the ministry 
(2000:133). 
 On 17 March 1949, the Progressive Socialist Party was established after 
Junblat had concluded that individual work in public policy and parliamentary work is 
useless no matter how great a leadership the politician carries (Safi 2006:54). The 
founding administrative board was formed of six figures, Kamal Junblat, Albert Adib, 
Farid Jubran, Sheikh Abdallah Alayli, Fouad Rizk, and Dr. Goerge Hana (Rihana, 
2007[volume 2]:49). The party’s ideology and agenda were largely based on the vision 
of its founder. According to Junblat, the creation of the party “is the result of long 
months and years of collective exploration and research, scientific enlightenment, and 
meditation” (Junblat, 2004:23). He also asserts that most of the charter was written in 
the summer of 1946, and that it was re-written and re-printed several times (Junblat, 
2004:23). The charter was actually never published, and in fact it was later changed 
(Ibid). 
On 3 May 1949, two days after the parties first celebration, al-Hayat 
newspaper wrote “the PSP calls for decentralization, expanding authorities and limiting 
responsibilities, a secular state that respects individuals’ beliefs, the abolishment of the 
sectarian political system, and fighting against systems of collective dictatorships” (Al-
Hayat newspaper, 1949: 22). 
From 1949 leading until the elections of 1951, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
escalated while the Lebanese system was overflowing with corruption. Kamal Junblat’s 
parliamentary opposition was at its peak, calling for the abolishment of parliament 
(Safi, 2006: 72). Preparation for elections had started and Junblat’s popularity had 
spread. Although the majority of PSP members were Druze, the party’s popularity had 
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spread to other sects. The state tried to stop the spread of socialism and the increase in 
Junblat’s popularity by suppressing the PSP’s work by legal and illegal means. PSP 
members were fired from their jobs in government institutions; they were also refused 
to serve in the army and gendarmerie. The conflict escalated even more during a 
meeting in Barouk where gunshots broke out between the security forces and a PSP 
group. The security members claimed that the party’s members had been hiding 
weapons. Three members of the PSP were killed, and almost 58 arrested (Timoviv, 
2000:179-182). The elections of 1951 were perceived as a victory for Junblat. He then 
formed a parliamentary bloc with nine other MP’s25 under the name of “the Nationalist 
Socialist Front” (Safi, 2006:111). 
Opposition against the president increased with more loyalists switching 
positions, such as Hamid Karami, a feudal leader from the North, Anwar Al Khatib, 
Abdallah Al-Haj, and a coalition of Islamic Parties named “The Popular Front” 
(Rihana, 2007[volume 4]: 56). They called for the resignation of President Beshara El-
Khoury and organized a general strike calling for reform along with two-days of 
demonstrations in Beirut and other regions of the country (Timoviv, 2000:213). 
President El-Khoury resigned under pressure from the opposition. Now, 
socialist ideology dominated Junblat’s thoughts especially when Camile Chamoun, 
member of “the Nationalist Socialist Front” was elected to Presidency (Timoviv, 2000: 
227). Junblat’s requests for reforms would fall on deaf ears. The president renewed his 
promises to reform the system. MP’s who were part of Junblat’s alliance refused to give 
the “the Nationalist Socialist Front” a majority in the government. In 1953 the President 
abolished parliament and called for new elections. The results were devastating. Junblat 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Piere Eddeh representing the “national bloc”, Ghasan Tweini representing the Syrian Social National 
Party (SSNP), while Camil Chamoun and Emile Bustany were considered independents. 
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lost a significant number of seats in different areas of Lebanon. Only he and another 
PSP member running in the Chouf26 were elected to the Parliament. Rihana rightfully 
notes: “the exaggeration in the role of the revolutionary masses and that of the socialist 
front backfired against Junblat” (2007, [volume 6]:137-150). 
The first protest organized by Kamal Junblat and other leftist parties took 
place in 1954. The PSP leader participated in preparing for a student protest that took 
place on 27 March. The slogans of the demonstration were against the United States’ 
attempts to include the Middle East in an alliance opposed what Washington called the 
“communist threat”. The authorities used force against demonstrators and one PSP 
member was shot dead (Safi 2006: 202-203).It is important to note here that the alliance 
between the PSP and other leftist movements, in particular the LCP, was not based on 
internal social ground during this period (Timoviv 2000:337). 
The period between 1956 and 1958 witnessed the rise of Jamal Abdel Nasser 
and the emergence of two poles in the Middle East: the revolutionary and conservative 
states. Lebanese politicians were also divided along these lines (Safi 2006:216). In 1957 
President Camile Chamoun endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine.27 This lead to tensions 
between Abdel Naser and Chamoun as well as a fierce parliamentary opposition against 
the treaty (Rihana, 2007[volume 7]: 39-40). Junblat’s opposition to Chamoun during 
this period was not as strong as that of the rest of his parliamentary allies and soon the 
president suspended parliament and called for new parliamentary elections (Safi, 
2006:247-248). Not only did the opposition candidates lose in all constituencies, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 An area in the mountains of Lebanon largely populated with the Druze sect. 
27 Use of the US army to defend the countries of the Middle East without aggression by any state 
subject of world communism and the adoption of $200 million to assist these countries in the 
development of its economy and strengthen armed forces. 
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their main leading figures such as Kamal Junblat, Saeb Salam, Abdallah Al Yafi, and 
Ahmad Al Asad were also defeated in the elections (Timoviv, 2000:260).    
During this period Junblat grew fond of Abdel Nasser and the Arab 
revolutionary alliance and he soon started to receive weapons from Abdel Nasser 
through Syria (Timoviv, 2000:261). Tensions in Lebanon soon escalated: clashes in the 
Chouf during the summer of 1957, strong opposition against the nomination of 
President Chamoun for another term, and the division of the country between two 
opposite camps (Rihana, 2007[volume 7]:90). This escalation reached a breaking point 
when the leftist journalist Nassib El Matni was assassinated. The opposition held the 
authorities responsible for the waves of provocation and assassinations that had swept 
the country. Bloody conflict spread from Tripoli passing through Beirut and reaching 
the Chouf. The opposition started organizing uprisings in its spheres of influence (Safi, 
2006:277-291). 
Towards the end of the first week of the 1958 revolution, the opposition had 
taken control of a major part of Lebanese territories. Chamoun and allies held Syria and 
Egypt responsible for the escalation in Lebanon. The opposition was not internally 
coherent, as each party worked as a separate entity without coordination. This was one 
of the reasons that left the opposition unable to over throw Chamoun from the 
presidency (Timoviv, 2000:267-271). It was during this period that Junblat formed the 
so-called “popular forces”, which included members from different sects and areas of 
Lebanon (Timoviv, 2000: 270).  
Gradually Junblat created in the Chouf an administration that consisted of 
agencies able to meet the needs of the people and maintain public order. The only 
criterion that was taken to appoint administrators was their competency and political 
beliefs, disregarding sectarian considerations. Thus, for the first time in Lebanon, and in 
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particular in the Chouf area, a non-sectarian representation was established based on 
secular considerations. Junblat believed that this criterion should be followed in the 
entire country in the efforts to build a strong Lebanon (Timoviv, 2000:268). 
Few days after the 1958 revolt, a military coup took place in Baghdad and 
overthrew the monarchy. The US feared that Iraq may join the UAR. Invoking the 
Eisenhower doctrine, the U.S. Sixth Fleet warship appeared on the Lebanese coast; 
Washington announced that the warship’s task was to protect its nationals in Lebanon 
and to help stability in the Middle East. In addition to the warship, the US, through 
Robert Murphy, President Eisenhower’s personal delegate, nominated Foad Chehab for 
the presidency in agreement with Abdel Nasser, and France. Murphy conducted some 
negotiations with the different Lebanese factions to secure Chehab’s nomination, 
including Kamal Junblat and Patriarch Mouchy. Foad Chehab was later supported 
unanimously by opposition leaders on a condition that the U.S. warships leave 
Lebanese water (Safi, 2006: 300-303). 
Christian parties were not pleased with the election of Chehab, and after 
Rashid Karami was appointed prime minister, the Phalanges Party declared a counter-
revolution. Over 28 peoples were killed and 53 injured in clashes that spread to areas 
outside Beirut. While Junblat called for the punishment of those causing clashes, 
Chehab and the rest of Junblat’s allies preferred a compromise solution (Timoviv, 
2000:276-277). Soon a new government was formed that included Rashid Karami, 
Hussein Al-Oweini, the Phalanges Leader Pierre Jumayil and the National Bloc leader 
Reymond Edde under the slogan of “no victor, no vanquished”. This approach worried 
Junblat who believed it would only result in strengthening the sectarian system in 
Lebanon. According to him, the only solution was by forming a new government of 
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national and secular parties that would gradually implement non-sectarian 
administrative reforms (Rihana, 2007[volume 7]: 14-20).  
Although Junblat was against sectarian government rule, the period between 
1958 and1964 was the only period when the PSP leader tried to reform the system from 
within government rather than from the opposition. During this phase, Junblat was 
appointed minister of education, minister of justice, minister of transportation and 
design, and of the interior (Rihana, 2007 [volume 8]: 73, 75, 97, 101, and 109). His 
reform efforts were clear in the positions he held. He suggested a number of reforms, 
including: municipalities in the villages and cities, the establishment of cooperative 
societies, the protection of Lebanese agriculture and industry from foreign competition, 
the application and modification of labor laws, the prevention of arbitrary dismissal of 
workers, a national health care system, the enactment of a new rental law that suits the 
needs of the poor, the protection of national banks and prohibiting drugs, smuggling as 
well as the elimination of corruption in the public morals (Rihana, 2007 [volume 8]:110 
to 113). 
 
4.3 – The Transformation of Kamal Junblat’s Stance 
In the 1960s Junblat felt a bitter disappointment towards his former allies in 
the opposition. He came to a conclusion that what they considered a “struggle” was 
merely selfish concerns whenever circumstances resulted in the denial of the privileges 
granted to them by the National Charter, whether a ministerial position or a 
parliamentary seat. This reflection of the causes of failures led Junblat to conclude that 
the struggle towards a democratic secular socialist Lebanon requires different 
techniques and methods (Timoviv, 2000:292). 
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Until the early 1960s Junblat was cautious towards his the Soviet Union. In 
many of his writings he condemned the totalitarian Soviet system’s approach on the 
division of social classes. He did not differentiate between the United States and the 
Soviet Union during the beginning of the Cold War, and believed their competition 
reflected a threat to the peoples of the world. It was until grounds of an alliance were 
built between Moscow, Syria, and Egypt in the 1960’s that Jounblat now believed that 
the USSR was an ally to the progressive Arab regimes (Timoviv, 2000:337). A long-
term alliance between the LCP and the PSP was thus concluded in 1965. 
Communications between the two parties was re-established after a long hiatus (Batal: 
51, 53).  
The years 1969 through 1975 were the period that made the Palestinian issue 
the core conflict between the right and left wings in Lebanon. It is also the period in 
which the Lebanese National Front was formed, made up of several parties of 
nationalist and leftist figures. It was founded in 1969 but was only activated in 1973 
under the leadership of Kamal Junblat. It called for political and economic reforms as 
well as a clear declaration of the Arab identity of Lebanon. Junblat was also able to 
gather the leftist parties in Lebanon under the slogan of supporting the Palestinian 
resistance movement and its right to launch commando operations from Lebanese 
territories (Timoviv, 2000:332). 
In November 1969, the Cairo agreement was signed. It established principles 
under which the presence and activities of Palestinian guerrillas in southeast Lebanon 
would be tolerated and regulated by the Lebanese authorities (Rihana, 2007[volume 
10]:111). During the 1970’s the Phalanges party stopped attacking the Palestinians in 
their speeches, instead Pierre Jumayil attacked the Lebanese Left and international 
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Communism, claiming that they were taking advantage of the Palestinian cause 
(Timoviv, 2000: 347). 
In 1973 both camps starting arming themselves. Right wing Christians parties 
on the one hand and the Palestinians with their Muslim and leftist allies on the other, 
started training and arming themselves (Rihana, 2007 [volume 10]: 84, 85). Tension 
rose until the eruption of the civil war in 1975, and the beginning of the 2-year war 
(Harb Al-Sanatayn) between the Phalanges and their allies in the “Lebanese Front” (Al-
Jabha Al-lobnaniya) and Kamal Junblat and the parties of the “Lebanese National 
Movement” (Al-Jabha Al-Wataniya Al-Lobnaniya). Jounblat called for the isolation of 
the phalange, outlawing its activities and expelling its ministers from the government 
(Traboulsi, 2008: 329-330). 
The LNM declared the “transitional agenda for democratic reform of the 
Lebanese system” (Al-Bornamij Al-Intikali lil-islah Al-Dimokraty Lil-Nizam Al-
Lobnany). This called for: the abolishment of the sectarian quotas (Mohasasa) on 
political and administrative levels; an optional civil law for personal status (Kanoun 
Madani Ikhtiyari Lil-Ahwal Al-Shakhsiya); a new electoral law based on proportional 
representation with Lebanon as one electoral district; administrative decentralization; 
and the creation of an assembly with no sectarian restriction. This agenda was 
positively received, but Jumayel refused the reforms. The fighting consequently 
resumed. The “National Dialogue Committee” was formed and the agenda of the 
National Movement its main topic, but again no reforms were adopted (Traboulsi 2008: 
331). 
The alliance between the LNM and the Palestinian resistance was founded on 
common interests that intersected but did not overlap. The former wanted to use 
military pressure to impose political reforms that were not necessarily supported by 
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Palestinians while the Palestinians wanted the right to fight Israeli military forces from 
Lebanese territories (Traboulsi, 2008:351). The LNM managed to achieve military 
success at the beginning of the war and controlled almost 80 percent of Lebanese 
territory. However it soon splintered into factions as a result of the dispute with Syria. 
The LNM received several blows from the Syrian regime during its military 
intervention in Lebanon in June 1976, followed by the assassination of Junblat on 
March 16th 1977 (Harb Lubnan).  
After the assassination of Junblat, the LNM’s leadership fell to his son Walid. 
The demand for a new civil law was dropped to reassure the Muslims. As for its 
discourse, it turned into an Arab national discourse with sectarian behavior. It divided 
Lebanese sects into “national” and “anti-national” ones (Traboulsi, 2008:373). A clear 
deviation from secular to sectarian considerations took place during the War of the 
Mountains (Harb Al-Jabal) in 1983 when Walid Junblat and his party engaged in 
sectarian massacres against Christian villages (Traboulsi 2008:391). 
The turn that the PSP took after the assassination of Kamal Junblat is best 
shown in an interview conducted with Walid Junblat in 2011. He asserted that “the 
Lebanese civil war was a Syrian-Iraqi war on Lebanese land; a Syrian-Israeli war on 
Lebanese land, an American-Soviet war on Lebanese land. The right wing received 
weapons and money from Saddam Hussein and Israel; we were in the Syrian-Soviet 
alliance and received weapons from the Soviets through Syria”. He then presented the 
reasons why he abandoned his father’s reform platform claiming that “the Lebanese 
civil war was pure absurdity of no benefit and if we were in agreement to reform and 
abolish the Lebanese sectarian system we would not have gone into the war in the first 
place”. Junblat clearly sets his priorities for fighting Israel rather than reforming the 
system during this era stating that “after the assassination of Kamal Junblat, and even 
62 
 
though someone from the Syrian regime had killed him, I said I will forgive but not 
forget. Because of Lebanon’s geographic standing, I am forced to ally with Syria 
against Israel” (interview with Walid Junblat, 2011, Dream TV) 
Before the Taif Accord, an agreement was signed in Damascus, between 
Junblat, Nabih Berri, and Elie Hobeika the leader of the Lebanese Forces. The 
“Tripartite Agreement” created committed to end the war and dismantle militias within 
a year. Politically, they agreed on an equal representation of Muslims and Christians, 
the abolition of political sectarianism after a brief transitional period, and the creation 
of a new balance between the authorities of the President of the Republic and those of 
the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the House (Traboulsi, 2008: 394). 
The abolition of political sectarianism was never implemented, however 
Kamal Junblat’s efforts towards socialism, reform, and secularism were replaced by 
Walid Junblat’s sectarian conclusions rather than the principles of social reform, and 
thus to feudal ways. The elections of 2000 made clear the choices of the PSP. It allied 
with the “former enemies” under the slogan of “dialogue” and sectarian and political 
“reconciliation” (Ashti 2004: 281). 
 
4.4 – Evaluating the Experience of the PSP: The Accomplishments  
 This section will evaluate the strength and weaknesses of the PSP concluded 
from the overview presented in the section above. We will begin by elaborating on 
four strengths the PSP led by Kamal Junblat has contributed in improving Lebanese 
system, and the circumstances of the left in general. The PSP was able to convey 
change from within the system, a dynamic that no other leftist party in Lebanon 
enjoyed. It has also contributed a great deal in strengthening the leftist alliance and 
through its international presence it took Lebanon’s leftist reputation to a broader 
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level, and finally its lenient ideology helped the party adapt according to Lebanon’s 
needs.  
 
4.4.1 – Change from within the System 
Having come from a feudal family and from it to a system based on feudal 
leaders, Kamal Junblat was perceived as a strange man. His high intellectual and 
socialist beliefs were awkward to his fellow feudal leaders, and his constant demands 
for social reform were simply conceived as strange (Timoviv2000: 150,151). Junblat 
did not melt into the system and was always repeating his demands and trying to 
implement his socialist beliefs. Moreover, most of the alliances he formed were 
catalyst to his reform or political demands. Indeed, the PSP leader was able to change 
the nature of the Lebanese political game, though within limits (Timoviv, 2000: 150-
151; Rihana, 2007[volume 6]:27).  
Junblat’s concrete reforms can be found in his work in the ministries he 
headed and through some bills he was able to pass in parliament. For example, as 
minister of national economy, agriculture and social affairs, Junblat put a stop to 
bribery in the ministry. He used to disguise himself and go around the departments to 
apprehend all actions of bribery. As Minister of Education, Junblat was able to 
establish public schools in underdeveloped areas in the North, South, and Bekaa. As 
Minister of Interior, his goals were the separation of the security forces from the 
army, the freedom of organized demonstrations, the organization of relations with the 
Palestinian resistance, the release of political detainees and banning their prosecution, 
and the freedom to form political parties. Junblat even licensed left-wing and national 
parties that had been outlawed for a long period (Timoviv, 2000: 212-214; Ashti and 
Ashti: 44; and Rihana [volume 6]:40-44). 
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The PSP leader was also able to pass a bill in parliament which aimed to 
monitor the illicit enrichment of politicians (Timoviv, 2000:242). The PSP also 
submitted many draft laws including laws pertaining to compensation for unemployed 
workers, collaborative agricultural projects, medical security system, the amendment 
to the law of elections, and abolition of class titles (Timoviv, 2000: 242;Rihana, 
2007[volume 6]:47; and PSP booklet).  
 The PSP leader also took part and at times even led demonstrations and strikes 
calling for reform even though he was part of the system. In August 1965, the PSP, 
the LCP, and the Arab Nationalist Movement called for a popular gathering in support 
of the farmers’ struggle. Kamal Junblat highlighted the list of the farmers’ demands 
related to trade monopoly. In April 1968, the instructors and students at the Lebanese 
University started a 50 days strike. They asked respectively for: a wage raise, tenure, 
a unified campus, and an increase in scholarships. The university’s administration did 
not respond to any of their demands. However, the students managed to win 
recognition of “the national union of the Lebanese University students that was won 
over by a Leftist coalition, the CLP, PSP, and CAO.” This highlighted the radical 
nature of the student movement at the time (Traboulsi 2008: 254, 301). 
 
4.4.2 – Strengthening the Lebanese Left 
The Druze sect in Lebanon is considered to be a minority compared to the 
larger Muslim and Christian sects. However Kamal Junblat was always the leading 
figure amongst the many influential leaders he aligned with. He headed the “Reform 
Bloc” and the “National Liberation Bloc” that included Sunni and Christian feudal 
sectarian leaders. Junblat was the major figure in the coalition influencing and 
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imposing his socialist demands.  He also led the 1958 drive to oust President 
Chamoun.  
Consequently, the PSP spread to different sects rather than restricting itself 
solely to the Druze; its leadership included many Christians. Even though the majority 
of the PSP’s organizational base remained Druze, the ideas of the party and its secular 
spirit attracted to its ranks youths with radical tendencies from the Maronites, Roman 
Orthodox, Sunni, and Shi‘a sects. Towards the end of the 1950’s the party gathered 18 
thousand members (Timoviv, 2000: 179 and 294). 
The PSP’s popularity, as well as its President’s strong political influence, were 
powerful factors of the left’s rise in Lebanon. The strength Junblat gave the Left in 
Lebanon can be seen through the 1970 Presidential elections between Elias Serkis and 
Suleiman Frangieh. Junblat forced both candidates to a meeting with him and the 
leftist parties in Lebanon. The meetings they conducted with the candidates separately 
were closer to an exam where the candidates were asked questions about their 
agendas.  The next day the newspapers wrote that Elias Serkis failed the exam and 
soon Suleiman Frangieh would become President (Timoviv, 2000: 348 - 350)  
Junblat’s contribution to the Left was recognized by his allies when he was 
elected president of the LNM. Goerge Hawi, an LNM and Communist leader 
suggested that “the Lebanese National Movement, led by Kamal Junblat, was one of 
the fundamental powers qualified to play an important role in reform. It is a popular 
movement, democratic, national, and progressive, presents the right formula for class 
political coalition and its leader has a personality that reflects all this” (Batal: 120). 
Some have suggested that his adherence to socialist principles and demands, in 
addition to his refusal to surrender militarily before achieving his reform agenda, were 
the reason behind his assassinated (Hazran 2007:169). 
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4.4.3 – The International Dimension 
Rarely does a Lebanese Member of Parliament, minister, or party leader 
become internationally a well known as Junblat was. He was one of those few who 
rose to the international level, yet it was not on the basis of his Druze leadership but 
on the foundation of his socialist ideology. He was internationally recognized and 
visited country leaders as one of the men of thought and liberation movement leaders. 
More importantly, and although he has strong regional and international relations he 
was not subservient to any foreign country or leader or camp. 
Junblat visited India inspired by Ghandi’s socialism and met with his socialist 
counterpart, as well as Indian PM Jawaher Lal Nahro. In France, he met George 
Marche, secretary general of the communist party, and had distinctive ties with the 
French Socialist Party and its President Francois Mitterrand. He had close ties with 
former President of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito and former President of Chile 
Salvador Allende. He visited the USSR and built a relationship with the Soviet 
Communist Party. He accepted an invitation to the United States and met with high 
officials where he spoke frankly against their policy in the Middle East. Junblat 
visited many leaders and presidents in the Arab world, but held a strong bond and 
great admiration to President Nasser and his socialist policies (Timoviv, 2000:189-
197, 236-241; Safi, 2006: 217-222).  
The PSP leader also conducted a number of activities in the international 
politics. He called for the first Arab Socialist parties’ conference held in Beirut in 
1951, headed the conference of the Asian-African peoples in 1960, represented 
Lebanon in the Asian-African solidarity conference, headed a parliamentary and 
public delegation to Popular China in 1966, and headed the Arab delegation to 
commemorate Nasser. He was elected President in 1973 to the “Democratic Front for 
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Arab participation in the Palestinian Revolution” from representatives of 47 
organizations of socialist, national, and democratic orientation. Finally, an essential 
event which proves that Junblat’s reputation goes beyond local and regional borders 
was in 1971 when he received the Lenin Prize for “peace and friendship between the 
peoples”  (Rihana, 2007[volume 12]: 34,37,113; Timoviv, 2000:360-361).  
 
4.4.4 – The Lenient Ideology   
Since the PSP was not subservient to any international or regional country, it 
enjoyed the privilege of having a lenient ideology that could be structured and 
developed according to Lebanon’s needs. The party is mainly based on its leader’s 
concepts and beliefs. Junblat constantly emphasized the independence of his party 
asserting that “we are not communist socialists, national Russian Marxists, bourgeois 
socialist democrats, national Nazi socialists, nor fascist capitalists. We have taken 
what is right of all these movements and built the ideal progressive socialist theory 
(Junblat 2004:23, 126) 
According to Junblat, the PSP is “a point of view of life on political, social 
and spiritual levels. It was not created as a tool to be in power or as a tool for 
exploitation” (Junblat 2004:12).The fact that socialism begins with the human’s 
behavior in his daily life does not contradict Junblat’s living. Although a descendent 
of a feudal family, Junblat’s way of life mirrors his socialist principles. In order to 
prove he was able to apply his socialist principles in practice, he gave a hundred 
hectares of land to the farmers in Siblin in the Chouf Mountains (Chink 1999: 78). He 
spent much of his time with the “commoners” and insisted that he be called 
“comrade” rather than “Kamal Beik”. His feudal family and fellow traditional leaders 
were astonished and disturbed by the simplicity of his clothing, his loose tie, and 
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inexpensive shoes. Lebanon’s political elite saw this as a brazen challenge to proper 
social wares (Timoviv, 2000: 149 and 150).   
 The PSP leader strongly believed that Progressive Socialism is the only road 
to salvation for Lebanon since Lebanon has all the social, economic and political 
elements to become a socialist country one day. However, he believed that to do so 
requires total openness and faith in ones capabilities self and in the human being 
(Junblat 2004:149,230). 
 Junblat’s belief that socialism needs to be catered to Lebanese society 
underscores his expresses a farsightedness. After all, an important factor in the LCP’s 
decline was its later subordination to the USSR. The mixture between the PSP’s 
moderate ideology and the means it managed in hope of implementing its principles 
led to the PSP’s deviation from socialism whether moderate or subservient. This 
setback opens to the next section that looks at some of the pitfalls of Junblat’s project 
in Lebanon. 
 
4.5 – Evaluating the Experience of the PSP: the weaknesses  
 The PSP’s weaknesses are also divided into four different yet interrelated 
topics. Through them we will be able to understand more thoroughly the misfortunes 
that led to the fall of the left. Also throughout the overview it becomes evident the 
internal conflicts Kamal Junblat was going through. These conflicts were essential 
elements in forming leftist parties, whether the feudal-socialist or the sectarian secular 
conflict. Such a divergence affected Junblat’s alliances on different levels. Another 
crucial factor of a socialists beliefs would be democracy, yet the party’s’ internal 
democracy was not a model to follow.       
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4.5.1 – The Feudal-Socialist Conflict 
As a child Kamal Junblat refused to be addressed by his hereditary title 
“Kamal Beik”. During his youth, he clashed with his mother over his ideological 
socialist beliefs (Timoviv 2000:53, 80). Junblat would carry this clear feudal socialist 
conflict with him until the rest of his political life. However, he never clearly chose 
between one over the other. This was evident through many of his actions and 
practices.  
Kamal Junblat hesitated before accepting to assume the “Mokhtara 
Leadership.” He visited Najib Beik Abu Sawan, a highly respected man and an old 
friend of the Mokhtara, to discuss with him this matter. Towards the end of their 
discussion, Junblat claimed: “I am convinced that I have to face my destiny yet I am 
not satisfied”. Thus the journey of conflict between his feudal roots and socialist 
beliefs had started (Timoviv 2000:90, 91).  
Junblat’s alliances from the beginning of his political life until the 1960s did 
not always match his progressive socialist thoughts. He entered parliament in 1943 for 
the first time allying with his family’s traditional allies. His political stand soon 
differed than the bloc he was a member of. The main reason behind this is Junblat’s 
belief that Lebanon should gain its complete independence from France and not 
because of differences of domestic reforms (Rihana, 2007 [volume 4]: 16-18). 
Junblat’s alliances give a better understanding of this socialist-feudal conflict. 
In 1947, and under “the national liberation bloc, Kamal Junblat aligned himself with, 
Abdel Hamid Karami, former prime minister a scion of Tripoli’s traditional Sunni 
family elite, Omar Al-Daouk a politician from the Beiruti Sunni Family Figures, 
Alfred Naccache, former president and prime minister from the traditional Maronite 
elite of Beirut, Henry Faroun, one of the traditional Maronite business and political 
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families in Achrafieh, and “the national bloc”, a Christian Lebanese party established 
by Emile Edde in 1943 and later headed by his son Reymond (Ashti and Ashti, 
2007:13). 
Kamal Junblat formed the PSP in 1949. He invited politicians, journalists, 
social and educational figures for tea to celebrate the establishment of the party. Some 
journalists wrote the next day that “the first socialist party in Lebanon was established 
in a bourgeois tea party” (Timoviv 2000:164)! Even after the establishment of the 
PSP, the Druze leader continued to ally himself with traditional Lebanese leaders and 
not the LCP, though the latter had been active in Lebanon since 1924. 
Between 1949 and 1950 a “Party Committee Alliance” was formed under only 
one slogan “abolishing parliament and conducting fair and free elections”. The 
coalition was formed of the PSP, the Union Republican Party that emerged from the 
SSNP (Syrian Social Nationalist Party), “the national bloc” led by Emile Edde, and 
“the Liberation Bloc” led by Abdel Hamid Karami. The “National Socialist Front” 
was formed between 1951 and 1952 with similar alliances. In 1953 a conference was 
held in support of the Arab people in Marrakesh. This conference was later 
transformed to include reform demands such as the abolition of political sectarianism, 
economic unity with Syria, preservation of Lebanon as an Arab state, and resistance 
against colonial movements. These demands seemed similar to leftist demands, 
however the coalition appeared to have a Muslim tilts with most of the parties having 
Muslim backgrounds. The main parties included were  the PSP, “the National Call 
Party” and “the National Commission” the latter two were Muslim parties allied to 
British policy in the region, “the Islamic Youth”, the SSNP, “The Popular Front”, “the 
group of Abdel Rahman, and Tripoli’s organizations”(Ashti and Ashti 2007:14-17).  
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The socialist-feudal conflict can also be noticed in the compromises Junblat 
made after entering the Lebanese political system. During the beginning of the 1950s 
Junblat constantly spoke about corruption in the Lebanese system and asserted that an 
error in the system occurred when the regime did not transcend the National Charter, 
which according to him was supposed to be only a temporary arrangement, towards 
the establishment of a secular state (Timoviv, 2000:203). Yet in 1957 Junblat aligned 
with some Lebanese traditional Muslim figures after losing the elections, such as Saeb 
Slam, Abdallah El-Yafi, Ahmad El-Asaad, Kamel El-Asaad and Sabri Hamadi. Their 
alliance called for a number of demands, one of which was the adherence to the 
National Charter (Ashti and Ashti, 2007:15-16)! Junblat would later return to his 
primary stance criticizing the National Charter.  
 According to Junblat the 1958 revolt was a historic opportunity to abolish 
confessionalism and establish a non-sectarian political system. It was not only a revolt 
to overthrow Chamoun. However, the traditional Sunni allies allied with him opposed 
his demand to eradicate the entire system of political sectarianism since they were the 
main beneficiaries of that system (Hazran 2010:162-163). The end-point of the 1958 
revolt was the resignation of Chamoun and not the abolishment of the sectarian 
system. However Junblat proceeded to work from within the system and with his 
traditional political allies although there would always be a clear difference in 
principles between the two.     
Between 1958 and 1964, during the presidency of Fouad Chehab, the political 
opposition of those parties with sectarian roots and represented in the government 
such as the Phalanges Party, the PSP, and the National Bloc decreased compared to 
the previous years. Their opposition during this period was mainly based on the 
difference in perspectives on the distribution of power in the government (Ashti and 
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Ashti 2007:16-17). Junblat’s integration into the establishment, as Hazran notes, 
“proved to be based on utilitarian and functional considerations, rather than driven by 
any ideological dimension. He saw the government apparatus as an instrument to 
expand his spheres of influence” (2010:164). 
Junblat was well aware of his traditional allies’ agenda, yet chose to ignore the 
lack of common principles. For example Junblat formed with Chamoun, Salam and 
other traditional figures, the “Socialist Bloc” in the early 1950s. Camile Chamoun 
became president and implemented none of the “Socialist Bloc” reform requests, Saeb 
Salam became prime minister and refused not only to reform according to the 
“Socialist Bloc’s” agenda but also deprived the bloc from a reasonable representation 
in the government (Timoviv, 2000:225-228). 
Furthermore, when Junblat stood by Chehab throughout his presidency he was 
well aware of the latter’s indifference to eliminating the sectarian system, and his aim 
in preserving the balance between Muslims and Christians. Nevertheless, Junblat 
supported Chehab through most of the his mandate, integrating fully into the 
government, as did his supporters enjoy unlimited access to governmental positions 
(Hazran, 2010:163).Thus the PSP leader based his alliances on fragile grounds and 
short term ends. His allies rarely shared his goals but their presence was always a 
powerful tool in attaining influence in matters of political controversy. 
 
4.5.2 – The Sectarian Secular Conflict 
The PSP leader always emphasized throughout his political career the 
necessity of establishing a secular system in Lebanon. However, was this because he 
was from a minority sect? The answer to this question may be found in Junblat’s 
position as a Druze leader, his perception of the Maronites in Lebanon and their role 
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in the historical rivalry between the Maronites and the Druze, as well as his 
relationship with the Sunnis in Lebanon and Muslims in general. 
Historically, the Druze sect in Lebanon possessed great influence in the Chouf 
district. This was the area Kamal Junblat chose throughout his political life to run for 
elections. In 1953, the PSP leader’s electoral lists lost in several areas of Lebanon 
when he was in conflict before the elections with many of his allies who had 
representation in areas other than the Chouf. Only Junblat and another PSP member 
made it to parliament during that election year. As Timoviv argues, the exaggeration 
in the role of the PSP led Junblat to run single party electoral lists in different areas of 
Lebanon (Timoviv 2000:230). However Junblat knew the Druze would always back 
him up. 
Moreover, the secular PSP leader felt he had the right to take part in the Druze 
sect’s religious affairs and was a strong advocate of the Druze religious establishment. 
Consequently Junblat stood unopposed by the spiritual Druze establishment that did 
not attempt to change Junblat’s political status (Shink, 1999:79, 82, 83). Hazran 
claims that the PSP had two primary platforms: abolishing the confessional system 
and creating a secular one, “both of which were aimed at revitalizing the role of the 
Druze in Lebanon, under the guise of progressivism and revolutionarism” (Hazran, 
2010:161).  
There are also several signs highlighting a strong link between Junblat’s 
political projection and the Druze’s historical rivalry with the Maronites. In 1975 
Junblat refused to attend President Franjieh’s ceremony to unveil a statue of Amir 
Fakhr El Dine in Beit El Dine and reacted by saying “the Lebanon of today does not 
represent the historical heritage or national unity which Fakhr El Dine embodied and 
we, the authentic Lebanese, feel alienated within confessional Lebanon” (Al-Nahhar 
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newspaper, 1975). Moreover, some historians argue that the leftist-Palestinian forces 
aimed to crush the Maronite military forces in the mountains during the Lebanese 
civil war. This was later emphasized in a speech of the late Syrian President Hafez Al 
Assad. Assad spoke about the last meeting that he had with Kamal Junblat. Junblat’s 
aim of the meeting was to convince the Syrian president that military action against 
the right wing was the only route in implementing the LNM’s reform agenda. 
According to Assad, Junblat was adamant about defeating the Maronites: “let us 
discipline them [Maronites], we must have decisive military actions. They have been 
governing us for 140 years”. Later in an interview the PSP leader was asked to 
comment on Hafez Al Assad’s accusations, instead he answered: “yes I am working 
for the elimination of the separatist Maronite regime in Lebanon… I want to eliminate 
the crusade character which is associated with our country” (Hazran, 2010:169). This 
suggests that Junblat’s objectives were shaped by his sectarian background. 
The Druze leader’s affiliations and political stand during much of his 
parliamentary career leaned towards Muslims. This alliance contributed to the 
transformation of the Lebanese civil war from a Left-Right wing conflict to that of a 
Muslim-Christian nature. Those sectarian signs did not appear suddenly during the 
civil war, they date back to the beginning of Lebanon’s modern history. For instance, 
in the 1950s it was easy for the right-wing Christians to pinpoint accusations against 
Junblat and his allies that the opposition against the president and their strike 
activities is that of a Muslims struggle towards overthrowing the Maronite presidency 
(Timoviv, 2000:212-214). 
Chink suggests that Junblat pinned his hopes on the Sunnis in Lebanon to 
implement his political objectives. He notes a comment by the PSP leader in 1958 
saying that the Sunni axis is essential given the location of the Sunni community in 
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the cities as well as their national path (1999: 85). Junblat’s Sunni alliances enabled 
him to increase the PSP’s presence in Sunni communities, which worried Junblat’s 
Sunni allies. This dispute between Junblat and the Sunni establishment developed into 
a real confrontation during the civil war (Hazran, 2010:167)  
 
4.5.3 – Building Alliances on Loose Grounds 
Although Kamal Junblat opposed totalitarian regimes such as the USSR, and 
disagreed with the communists on their notion of class struggle, the PSP leader was 
strongly influenced by Marxist ideology and believed it to be one of the greatest 
achievements of human thought (Timoviv, 2000:160). Thus Junblat could have easily 
found common ideological grounds to ally with leftist communist parties in Lebanon 
but instead formed coalitions with sectarian traditional figures. 
Since Junblat was well aware of the common ideological grounds with leftist 
thought before an alliance was established, it would be safe to argue that two main 
reasons behind the coalition that began to take shape with the leftist parties in 1964 
are: his sectarian identity and the geographical balance of power outside Lebanon. It 
was only after close ties were established between the USSR and Egypt under Nasser 
that Kamal Junblat felt comfortable to establish grounds with the leftist parties in 
Lebanon. He had reached this decision after playing the Lebanese political traditional 
game whether as an opposition or in the government. He had concluded that he would 
never be more than a local leader whose authority will never exceed the position set 
for a Druze in the sectarian system, which is a minister and a member of parliament 
(Timoviv, 2000:319). 
Furthermore, the alliance between the parties of the Left was not based on the 
common reform agendas they shared, but rather on support to the Palestinian issue in 
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particular. In 1969 when the leftist parties allied together in demonstrations that 
turned into bloody confrontations with the state authorities, they were demonstrating 
against the actions that the Lebanese army was taking against the Palestinian 
resistance. The Lebanese Left saw this as a revolutionary event that marked the 
beginning of a battle with the Lebanese establishment (Hazran, 2010: 164). Yet, even 
after they united together due to an external issue, a common internal platform was 
only established after the start of the Lebanese civil war (Ashti and Ashti 2007: 20). 
Nevertheless, this internal platform neglected the social and economic dimensions of 
the crisis and only emphasized political issues. The problematical issue that brought 
them together was neither the confessional system nor the lack of a governmental 
social policy, which later on became their reform agenda (Hazran, 2010:168). 
The struggle of power between the two superpowers in the region, and the 
regional geopolitical battles created the alliances of the leftist parties under the banner 
of the Palestinian cause. Junblat sought to make use of this equation in establishing a 
new secular system in Lebanon. Unfortunately this theory worked the other way 
around. This point could be emphasized through one of its main protagonists, George 
Hawi, when he summed up this period by saying: “we made mistakes, in many cases 
we replaced the realistic facts with our desires and we thought we could be masters of 
the game” (Hawi, 2005:88). The leftist parties in Lebanon led by Junblat thought they 
could use the geopolitical regional game to implement their political reforms. Instead, 
their game destroyed Lebanon.  
 As we have noted Junblat became aware that without the political, military 
and logistic assistance, his efforts to change the existing sectarian system would come 
to naught. Thus the PSP leader and his leftist allies were aided with weapons from 
Egypt and Syria, and trained by the Palestinian forces and the USSR (Hazran 
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2010:165; Timoviv: 261 and 326-328; interview with Walid Junblat on Dream TV, 
2011).This aid was not free of charge however, especially since the alliance between 
the LNM and the Palestinian resistance was founded on common interests that 
intersected but did not overlap (Traboulsi, 2008:351). Moreover, Hawi a leading 
member of the LNM, did not delay in confessing that it was wrong to make use of 
Palestinian and Syrian support to implement an internal national agenda especially 
since the external powers have contributed in transforming the conflict into a 
sectarian one (Hawi 1996:4, 10). This clear clash of interest and penetration of foreign 
powers in the national movement caused the anti-establishment front to fall apart and 
the assassination of Kamal Junblat by a regime he relied on greatly, the Syrian regime 
(Hazran, 2010: 169). 
 
4.5.4 – PSP: A leader or a Party? 
The PSP’s primary principle is building a society based on true democratic 
principles. This principle is very appealing and highly relevant, yet the PSP’s 
structure is irrelevant to such a principle. Kamal Junblat was president of the PSP 
from the year it was established in 1949 till the day he was assassinated in 1977, and 
was succeeded by his son Walid in a ‘hereditary election’ rather than a democratic 
one. Thirty-five years later, Junblat the son is still the president of the PSP. This 
evidently contradicts another PSP principle noted in the party’s booklet “the combat 
of feudalism and the prelude towards correct leaderships” (PSP booklet). 
The two highly contradictory principles have highlighted the path of the PSP 
after the death of Kamal Junblat until today. After the death of his father, and in his 
first speech during the celebration of the party’s foundation, Walid Junblat addressed 
the exact socialist principles Kamal had worked for. He claimed that “we will 
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continue to work towards the abolishment of all artificial class and sectarian barriers 
between the people of Lebanon” and that the “program of the LNM is the correct 
vision for a united Lebanon” (Rihana, 2007 [volume 15]: 53-54). Only twenty days 
after he gave this speech Junblat the son visited Assad in Syria. The meeting resulted 
in the Syrians acquired from the son what they could not from his father. 
Consequently, the LNM and the PSP dropped their civil reform demands to reassure 
the Muslims. As for its discourse, it turned into an Arab national discourse with 
sectarian overtones (Traboulsi, 2008: 373). 
In practice, social reform became to a certain extent extinct in the PSP’s 
political platform under Walid Junblat’s leadership, although never abandoned in 
principle. Thus the PSP of today vaguely resembles the name it holds and principles it 
calls for. It has taken the form of a traditional sectarian Lebanese party playing the 
game of quotas in the political system. This can be observed by a few comparisons 
with the PSP of Kamal Junblat. The latter established the PSP mainly based on the 
belief in the need to abolish the Lebanese sectarian system. His son Walid, on the 
other hand, has only one constant principle in his political career: the protection of the 
Druze sect. First, during the civil war and Mountain War, Walid Junblat and his party 
engaged in sectarian massacres against Christians: 1500 killed, 62 villages destroyed, 
and the displacement of the Christians in “mixed areas” (Traboulsi, 2008: 391). 
Although Kamal Junblats objectives were shaped by his sectarian position, his 
socialist principles were well-built to prevent him from falling into the hostile 
reaction his son chose.  
After the end of the civil war, Walid Junblat engaged in the Lebanese 
confessional system as a Druze leader without working towards abolishing the 
sectarian system, even though the Taif Accord called for this after a brief transitional 
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period. Throughout the 1990s and until today the PSP had no effective social reform 
activities with the leftist parties in Lebanon and when there is a call for any kind of 
social reform, unlike previously, the PSP contributes with shy statements only. In 
2011, inspired by the Arab spring in the region, an effective movement to abolish the 
sectarian system in Lebanon was organized by independent and leftist movements; the 
PSP stood aside inspecting and approving without mobilizing its supporters. 
Another example of the difference between Kamal and Walid Junblat’s PSP is 
their stance on the electoral law. The LNM headed by Kamal Junblat called in its 
transitional agenda for democratic reform and a new electoral law based on 
proportional representation with Lebanon as one electoral district without sectarian 
restrictions (Traboulsi, 2008: 331). Walid Junblat did not only do nothing in the path 
of implementing such a law, but when the idea of proportional representation was 
suggested in 2011 in the government, He declared in a speech against proportional 
representation that “I prefer a thousand times to win or lose in the Chouf between my 
people than to be dissolved in large areas” (Junblat speech in August 1, 2011). He 
further emphasized his refusal in an interview with Al-Manar TV saying: “if by 
implementing the law they were intending to strike my sphere of influence, the 
message has been received” (Al-Manar TV, November 2011). 
During his political career, Kamal Junblat was able to promulgate some social 
reforms. Yet it is well known that Kamal Junblat’s reforms were not in line with the 
interests of liberal capitalism, which serves the interest of the sectarian elite (Rihana, 
2007 [volume 6] : 40). In contrast to his father, Walid Junblat has opted to ally with 
leaders with capitalist agendas, such as former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. 
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4.6 – Conclusion 
Kamal Junblat once noted that “when the wheels of the revolution are 
launched it will be difficult to controlling its prospects if it lacks a systematic party 
base that holds the keys of guidance and the reins of leadership from within the 
system” (Timoviv, 2000:206-207). Although Kamal Junblat had intensions his 
practices were not always successful. His use of feudalism, sectarianism, wrong 
choices, and a party based leadership backfired after his death. His son and his 
followers later downsized the PSP from that of a leader of the left in Lebanon to a 
mere sectarian traditional party with a very appealing cover. After studying the two 
most influential leftist parties of Lebanon separately, the next chapter examines the 
alliances of the left through two coalitions that have changed Lebanon’s modern 
history, the Lebanese National Movement and the Lebanese National Resistance 
Front. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE LEFT IN PRACTICE: THE CASE OF THE LNM 
 
5.1 – Introduction 
 This chapter examines two major alliances formed among leftist parties in 
Lebanon: the Lebanese National Movement and the Lebanese National Resistance 
Front. The chapter opens with a brief overview of the two parties’ origins and 
evolutions. It then looks at their accomplishments and failures. 
 
5.2 – Origins and Evolution 
 In the mid-1960s, the Front of National and Progressive Parties and Forces 
(Jabhat al-Ahzab wal-Qiwa al-Taqadumiya wal-Wataniya), also known as the 
Revisionist Front, was formed. Shortly after that, it came to be known as the Lebanese 
National Movement (LNM) and assumed a prominent role at the start of the Lebanese 
Civil War and until the early 1980s (Collelo, 1987). 
The LNM was headed by the PSP under Kamal Junblat’s leadership. Inaam 
Raad, of the Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP) served as vice-president, while 
Mohsen Ibrahim, of the CAO, was its General Secretary. The LNM consisted of a 
number of Leftist parties: the LCP, the CAO, the SSNP, the Independent Nasserite 
Movement-Al-Mourabitoun, the Popular Nasserite Organization, the Arab Socialist 
Union, in addition to several independent figures including Albert Mansour, Ousama 
Fakhouri and Samir Franjiyeh (Traboulsi, 2008: 256). 
The LNM was strongly opposed by the Lebanese Front (LF), a largely 
Maronite coalition, gathering Suleiman Franjiye, Charbel Qasis (President of the 
82 
 
Maronite Order), Pierre Jumayel, Charles Malek, Edward Hanin (Vice president and 
Secretary General), and Fouad Boustani (Ibid). 
Generally speaking, the parties that participated in the Lebanese civil war can 
be grouped into two main bodies or camps: on the one hand, the LNM and its allies, 
mainly parties from leftist backgrounds in addition to some nationalist figures; and, 
on the other hand, the ‘Freedom and Human Front’ (Jabhat al-Horiya wal-Insan), 
which later came to be known as the Lebanese Front (Al-Jabha al-Lubnaniya). 
The “Joint Forces” (Al-Quwwat al-Mushtaraka) was the name of the armed 
wing of the LNM. It included militants from all the parties represented in the front. 
These parties were usually known as the ‘leftist forces’ or the ‘progressive forces’, 
although some were not strictly leftist (Zebian, 1977: 121). On the other hand, the 
armed wing of the LF was known as the Lebanese Forces (Al-Quwwat al-Lubnaniya), 
and sometimes as the Right or isolationist forces, because this group wanted to isolate 
Lebanon from its geographical context by creating an entity detached from its 
historical the Arab identity geographically (Zebian, 1977: 122). 
On the eve of the civil war, the forces composing the LNM were not 
homogenous nor in harmony. On 13 April 1975 the political work of the LNM 
metamorphosed into an armed struggle. Nevertheless, each party and group retained 
its own identity and vision of Lebanon (Zebian, 1977: 127). These disparities among 
the components of the LNM are due to the political and sociological fragmentation of 
Lebanese society. Moreover, this fragmentation itself is due to the sectarian, political, 
and economic formulas constraining political life in Lebanon, provoked mainly by the 
hierarchical and political practice of the established sectarian political parties and 
movements (Zebian, 1977: 128). 
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Starting in 1975, the LNM engaged in what is known as the ‘Two Years War’ 
(Harb al-Sanatayn), an armed conflict against the LF. In addition to fighting, the 
LNM called for the isolation of the Phalange Party, a main member of the LF, the 
outlaw of its activities and the expulsion of its ministers from the government. Soon 
this led to the resignation of the Christian ministers in solidarity with the Phalange 
Party while PM Rashid Karami resigned on solidarity with the LNM. As a result, then 
President Suleiman Franjieh, who was not able to contain the crisis, formed a military 
government to impose security and stability, a government that lasted three days and 
collapsed due to a strike organized by the LNM. Consequently, Franjieh assigned 
Karami to form a new government that would leave out both leaders of the conflicting 
camps. Thus the government, excluding the PSP and the Phalange Party, was formed 
and was able to reach a cease-fire with the help of Syrian officials as mediators 
(Traboulsi, 2008: 329-330). 
This war was seen as a conflict between security and reforms, where Lebanese 
internal variables played the most important role especially when it came to the 
process of the fighting and its outcomes, and mainly through the social crisis it 
created on the eve of the war and the popular movements it caused (Traboulsi, 1997: 
151). One of the main variables was the role of the Lebanese Army at that time: 
protecting the country from external enemies or maintaining internal security? The LF 
used force to impose “security and order”, while the LNM used force to impose 
political reforms (Traboulsi, 1997: 151). 
 According to Traboulsi, Mohsen Ibrahim, Georges Hawi, and Kamal Junblat 
were working to end the Lebanese conflict at the time. The project adopted by the 
communist Left and their view of Lebanese society produced the democratic political 
reform agenda of the LNM (Ibid: 152). The latter was criticized for being biased to 
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political reform. Consequently a social and economic reform plan was produced but it 
was not published officially because the LNM lost the battle on the Arab front 
(Traboulsi, 1997: 153). 
Thus, in 1975, the LNM declared the “transitional agenda for democratic 
reform of the Lebanese system” (al-Barnamaj al-Intiqali lil-Islah al-Dimuqrati lil-
Nizam al-Lubnani). It called for: the abolishment of sectarian quotas (al-muhasasa) 
on both political and administrative levels; the implementation of an optional civil 
law for personal status (qanoun madani lil-a7wal al-shakhsiya); the creation of a new 
electoral law based on proportional representation with Lebanon as one electoral 
district; and finally, administrative decentralization and the formation of a constituent 
assembly free from sectarian restriction (jam’iya ta’sisiya kharej al-qayd al-ta’ifi). In 
general, this agenda was positively received but Jumayel rejected the proposed 
reforms. The National Dialogue Committee (lajnat al-hiwar al-watani), which largely 
took on the LNM’s agenda, also failed to adopt any reforms (Ibid: 331). As a result, 
fighting resumed and massacres were carried out on both sides until, in January 1976, 
Syria imposed a cease-fire to salvage the Phalange Party (Ibid: 337-338). 
The relation between the LNM and Syria was deteriorating particularly after it 
became evident that the latter was planning for a military intervention in Lebanon in 
favor of the Phalanges.28 Even though the leader of the LNM had secretly met with 
Bashir Jumayel in June 1976 and the latter had agreed on the LNM’s suggested 
reforms due to the military pressure imposed by the LNM, Jumayel could not keep his 
promises as other members of the Phalange Party opted for the Syrian option. The 
Joint Forces, comprising of fighters from the LNM and Palestinian factions, fought 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28Assad had explicitly articulated his intentions in his meeting with Junblat on March 1976 (Traboulsi, 
2008: 339). 
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against Syrian troops but they had to give ground when Arab Deterrent Forces 
(Quwwat al-Rad‘ al-Arabiya), namely Syrian troops, entered Lebanese territory in 
November 1976 with an Arab consensus (Ibid: 347-348). 
The Syrian intervention tipped the balance of power in favor of the LF after 
the LNM had the upper hand both militarily and politically. Then, in March 1977 
Kamal Junblat was assassinated. Walid Junblat succeeded his father for the leadership 
of the LNM, while Mohsen Ibrahim of the CAO remained as Secretary General. The 
secretary-generals of the other parties’ of the LNM were appointed as deputies to the 
president (Traboulsi, 2008: 373). 
However, the radical reforms suggested in the LNM’s 1975 transitional 
agenda soon fell apart. A rather “defensive” agenda was put in place, an agenda that 
brought back sectarian features to the fore. Accordingly, the personal status reform 
was dropped to reassure Muslims who opposed it. Thus, even though the LNM’s 
discourse remained an Arab national one, sectarian traits had surfaced (Ibid). 
The assassination of Kamal Junblat debilitated the LNM. He had played an 
important role in burying sectarian tensions. Hence, it was a normal phenomenon, 
after the leading role Junblat had played in unifying the national movement and 
empowering its reform agenda, for the LNM to fall into stagnation (Ibrahim, 1983: 
85). After 1977, the LNM’s component fell from the pursuit of general national 
democratic objectives to sectarian specific interest (Ibrahim 1983: 86). 
In March 1978, Israel launched the Operation Litani against the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO), and LNM fought alongside the PLO. The one-week 
incursion caused major Lebanese and Palestinian human losses, estimated at around 
2000 killed and 250000 refugees (Chomsky, 1983: 192). It also increased the ongoing 
tension between the warring parties: LNM and the LF. 
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Meanwhile, the LF’s relation with Syria deteriorated as the LF soon rejected 
Syrias presence in the Christian areas. Consequently, the LF engaged in a fight 
against Syrian troops. And as the LF-Syria relationship started deteriorating, the 
LNM-Syria relationship began recovering, although according to Batal, it was never a 
trusted relationship as Syria’s relationship with the LF did not end (Edde, 2005: 84). 
In March 1980, the LNM organized a military parade commemorating 
Junblat’s assassination during which the “peace of the brave” (salam al-shuj‘an) 
project was put forward: it called for the restoration of national unity based on the 
new political balance between the warring camps. The LNM’s attempt failed as the 
LF rejected the proposal their opposition to the Palestinian presence in the country 
and their fear of converting Lebanon into an Islamic state (Traboulsi, 2008: 369). 
 By the early 1980s, the LNM looked like it had lost its momentum. It had 
been losing ground on military and political levels, especially after the Syrian military 
intervention shortly followed by Junblat’s assassination. June 1982, which saw the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon, marked the practical termination of the LNM and the 
beginning of the resistance against the invading Israeli troops under the umbrella of 
the Lebanese National Resistance Front (LNRF) (Jabhat al-Muqawama al-Wataniya 
al-Lubnaniya). 
 The LNRF was officially launched in September 1982, initiated by the LCP, 
the CAO and the Arab Socialist Action Party as an umbrella for the military work of 
the LNM and the remaining Palestinian factions. On the 16th of September 1982, 
Georges Hawi and Muhsen Ibrahim announced a joint communiqué inviting the 
Lebanese to join the LNRF and defend their city Beirut. The communiqué stated that 
the duty of defending the country is the noblest cause a person can fight for, and the 
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honor of fighting the occupier is the greatest honor for every nationalist.29 The LNRF 
fiercely fought Israeli troops and resiliently challenged Sharon’s promise of a “two 
weeks promenade”30 in Lebanon, turning it into bloody fighting that cost Israel dearly 
(Traboulsi, 2008: 387-388). The next section evaluates the experiences of the LNM 
and LNRF. 
 
5.3 – The Accomplishments of the LNM and the LNRF 
 The following sections of this chapter will outline the main strengths and 
weaknesses of the LNM and the LNRF combined highlighting the strong interrelation 
between them. Four main strengths are identified: the secular aspect, the reform 
agenda, the strong alliance, and fighting the Israelis. 
 
5.3.1 – The Secular Aspect 
The LNM endorsed a secular reformist movement that wanted to change the 
Lebanese sectarian system. According to the LNM’s view of the regional context of 
the struggle, a major defeat in the modern Arab history was the loss of Palestine in 
1948, leading up to the main defeat of Arabs in 1967. To these two events, the 
assassination of Jamal Abdel Nasser leading to the weakness of pan-nationalism, as 
well as the successive blows to the Palestinian resistance, are to be added to the list of 
events that had repercussions on the nationalist movement in Lebanon (Zebian, 1977: 
9). However, the LNM was seen at that time as the materialization of the dream of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Founding statement of the Lebanese National Resistance Front in Beirut on 16 September 1982. 
30 Ariel Sharon had promised Israelis that taking over Lebanon would require no more than two weeks. 
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left in Lebanon, as a path towards secularism, which was viewed as an optimal 
solution for the Lebanese system.  
In fact, the founding parties of the LNM identified in the previous section 
were mainly secular leftist parties, and their alliance under the LNM’s umbrella was 
based on their common views of secularizing the Lebanese confessional system. 
Geroge Hawi perceived the LNM as a popular, democratic, national and progressive 
movement that presents the right formula for class political coalition (al-tahalof al-
tabaqi al-siyasi) thus enabling the creation of a National Liberation Movement 
(harakat al-taharor al-watani) (Edde, 2005: 120). 
 
5.3.2 – The Reform Agenda 
 The reform agenda of the LNM was one of its strengths. It endorsed a political 
reform of the Lebanese system that starts at the base of the system, represented by the 
abolishment of sectarianism. Among other demands it called for the adoption of a 
new civil personal status law, as well as the implementation of a new electoral law in 
order to ensure a proportional representation that can develop the system and reform it 
efficiently. 
Thus, this agenda was not constrained to political reform. It also called for 
socio-economic reform. However, as Traboulsi asserts, the Marxist Left played a 
major role in the formulation of the LNM’s agenda, which means that political reform 
was considered necessary for socio-economic reforms (2008: 253-254) 
In fact, the leftist movement was able before the war to advance many of its 
demands and managed to acquire wide support. The Left was strongly integrated into 
the syndicates, which made it powerful and influential. The growth of such a 
movement in power and number threatened the pillars of the Maronite political 
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coalition representing the political feudalism of that time. According to George Hawi, 
the LNM was one of the fundamental powers qualified to play an important role in the 
reform process (Edde, 2005: 120). 
 
5.3.3 – The Strong Alliance 
 Since its inception, and until the 1982 Israeli invasion, when most parties 
gathered to fight the Israelis under the umbrella of the LNRF, parties forming the 
LNM have managed to maintain a strong alliance. Since the 1960s, the LNM faced an 
attack from the sectarian Lebanese authority, and fought for change and reform. The 
LNM gradually found itself developing from political struggle into an armed struggle 
at the eve of the civil war, and then most of its constituent parties turned towards 
fighting the Israeli enemy in the early 1980s. The LNM maintained its unity despite 
internal conflicts between its different forces, from different ideological backgrounds, 
and stood as a main focal point in confronting the successive attacks, despite its poor 
experience in military confrontation (Zebian 1977: 15). 
 
5.3.4 – Fighting the Enemy 
The LNRF was formed as a reaction to the 1982 Israeli invasion. After the 
communiqué, 16 September 1982, the LNRF fought its first military operation on the 
20th of September 1982 at al-Mathaf area in the suburb of Beirut. The LNRF 
undertook in its first year alone a total of 1113 resistance operations, nine hundred 
and seven of them were conducted against Israeli troops, while two hundred and six 
operations targeted Israeli agents in Lebanon. From 1982 until 1986, the Israeli army 
admitted the death of 386 soldiers. On the other hand, the LNRF lost 184 fighters. 
Seven thousand fighters participated in all the military operations from 1982 until 
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1990. Three thousand members of the LNRF were put in detention in Ansar and al-
Khiyam prisons.31 Consequently, Israel was forced to withdraw from Beirut and 
establish a security belt in south Lebanon. This was due mainly to the LNRF’s attacks 
against the Israeli army. 
This brief summary is intended to highlight one of the main strengths of the 
LNRF: the establishment of the armed resistance against Israeli forces. The LNRF 
managed to start a strong culture of resistance, later on appropriated by other parties, 
namely Hezbollah. However, it is important to note that it was first introduced by this 
group of leftist secular parties fighting for their country. 
 
5.4 – The Weaknesses of the LNM and the LNRF 
Despite the strengths discussed above, the LNM and the LNRF had several 
limitations. Some of them are derived from the aforementioned strengths themselves, 
while others from various miscalculations. This section goes through four of the main 
weaknesses of the LNM and the LNRF: first in relation to the above-mentioned 
strengths, and as a consequence of the alliances with the Palestinian factions and the 
Syrian regime. 
 
5.4.1 – The Strengths as Weaknesses 
Although it started as a strong secular alliance with a solid reform agenda, the 
LNM later took a sectarian turn and its ambitious reform demands were lost in the 
war. There were also tactical miscalculations that led to a gap between the LNM and 
its supporters: abandoning the democratic program made the LNM’s agenda look like 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The numbers are extracted from LNRF website: 
<http://www.jammoul.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=293&Itemid=72>. 
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a clause in a program promoting Muslim rights. Consequently, the LNM lost its 
democratic secular character. Hawi has argued that the LNM failed to place enough 
emphasis on the need for national reconciliation to ameliorate the conflict. Thus the 
LCP ignored the practices of its allies whom undermined the LNM’s reputation and 
decreased its public support through its wrongful actions during the civil war (in 
Edde, 2005: 155-157). 
As suggested above, the first stage of the war was about political reforms. The 
political struggle however escalated into an armed one after the Left found itself 
clashing with the pro-status quo mainly Christian parties. Both parties used armed 
force to impose their agenda and both resorted to external support. The LNM, 
however, miscalculated by allaying with the Palestinian factions, which undermined 
the Left more generally. 
Junblat’s assassination led to the LNM’s decline, proving that the strong 
alliance of the LNM was in fact only a result of the imposing character of Junblat and 
the submission of the parties forming the LNM to the desires of its leader. Thus, 
although it seemed like the alliance was not easily broken, what was holding it 
together was Junblat, and parties or members of the LNM who disagreed with any of 
his decisions preferred to protect the alliance even at the expense of their own beliefs. 
The loss of Junblat and his son’s succession to led the LNM further into 
sectarian fighting. Walid’s participation in the mountain war, where the PSP engaged 
in sectarian massacres against Christians gave the conflict a very sectarian overtone. 
According to Traboulsi, the war left 1500 killed; 62 villages destroyed, and caused the 
displacement of many Christians (2008: 391). This was a clear deviation from the 
secular foundation of the PSP and the LNM. 
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Finally, and although resistance against Israeli troops was a major strength of 
the LNRF, however, the preoccupation with fighting Israel distracted it from its own 
reform agenda. Consequently, the LNM’s social, economic and political reforms were 
marginalized. By the time the Israeli troops had started withdrawing from Lebanon in 
1985, the LNM’s reform agenda had become overshadowed with new sectarian 
dynamics. 
 
5.4.2 – Alliances with the Palestinian Factions and the Syrian Regime 
Since parties at war may not have too many choices the LNM and LNRF 
made use of whatever options were then available. They benefited greatly from 
the alliance with the Palestinian factions and from their experience in guerilla 
warfare. However, this turned to be one of the main weaknesses of the LNM 
because its short-term allies did not share the movement’s long-term goals for 
Lebanon. 
Zebian suggests that even though he championed the cause of Palestine 
always Kamal Junblat was constantly worried about the alliance with the PLO. 
The main problem was that the Lebanese progressive forces did not possess their 
own arsenal for revolutionary action, which made the alliance with the PLO a 
necessity (Zebian, 1977: 24). This in the long run undermined the LNM’s 
autonomy, and subjugated it to the interests of the PLO. This weakness of the 
Lebanese progressive forces led to imbalances in the relation with the Palestinian 
resistance. Additionally, there were some mistakes that occurred in the chaos of 
war under the slogan of resistance, an excuse that permitted the Lebanese 
authorities and Right wing parties to consider the Palestinian resistance an 
external threat to Lebanon, and therefore undermining the LNM’s credibility 
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(Zebian, 1977: 26-27). Thus, the alliance with Palestinian factions gave the LNM 
military capabilities, but deprived it from national public support. While some 
accepted its reform agenda, others viewed it as a volume of the PLO (Traboulsi, 
2008: 352). 
Another view states that the alliance between the LNM and the Palestinian 
resistance was found on common interests that intersected but did not match 
(Traboulsi 2008:351).The former wanted to use military pressure to impose 
political reforms that were not necessarily supported by Palestinians, while, on the 
other hand, Palestinians wanted to use Lebanon as a staging ground from which to 
launch military operations against Israel (Traboulsi, 2008: 341). Another example 
that can illustrate the fact that interests of the LNM and the Palestinians did not 
match is the choice of the LNM to ally with Yasser Arafat despite the fact that 
Arafat had clearly stated his intention to make peace with Israel, something that 
the LNM and later the LNRF strongly rejected. 
Geroge Hawi was candid when he confessed that his party, along with the 
LNM, placed on Lebanon, in the service of the Palestinian cause, a burden that it 
could not bear (Edde, 2005: 10). He also confessed that it was wrong that his party 
and LNM imagined that they could make use of Palestinian support in some 
instances, and Syrian support in others, to implement its national reform agenda 
(Ibid). After all, it was not the LNM’s reform agenda that ignited the civil war. If 
there had been no Palestinian conflict there would not have been a war in the first 
place.  
The Syrian intervention of 1976 ended the reformist dream of the Left in 
Lebanon. To be sure, the Syrian military intervention of 1976 neutralized the 
LNM’s attempts to impose reform by force (Traboulsi 2008: 253-254). The LF’s 
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willingness to cooperate with Syria against the LNM and its Palestinian allies 
suggests how far Maronite leaders were willing to go to protect their political 
prerogatives. Nevertheless, soon the LNM ignored the fact the Syrian regime was 
the main cause behind its defeat and decided to ally with it in exchange of military 
assistance against the LF. This may well be one of the LNM’s main 
miscalculations. The LNM was now forced to take stances contradicting its own 
beliefs. Before Kamal Junblat’s assassination, the LCP was against cutting all 
relations with Syria, and Hawi tried talking Junblat out of his firm opposition to 
Hafez el Asad, Nevertheless, the LCP supported Jumblat’s position. After the 
Syrian defeat of the LNM’s dream, ties with Syrians were re-established. Once the 
heart and soul of the LNM’s own existence, now political reform was no longer a 
priority for the left. 
 
5.5 – Conclusion 
 This chapter examined two main alliances among Lebanese leftist parties. 
It looked at origins, influence, decline, as well as accomplishments and setbacks of 
the LNM and LNRF. The chapter highlighted the experience of the Lebanese Left 
as a coalition of different parties that lured difficult choices. The importance of 
tackling such alliances is of fundamental importance to trace the path of the Left in 
Lebanon and weigh its possible future prospects. Since leftist parties are failing to 
introduce any change into the system individually, it is probably a coalition that 
may have to revive the Left in the future. The next chapter presents the general 
findings and conclusions of this study, and also compares the leftist experience in 
Lebanon with leftist experiences in Britain and France. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 – Summing Up the Argument 
Sectarian parties in Lebanon have fought furiously to maintain the Lebanese 
confessional system, a matter that has clearly staggered the leftist path in Lebanon. 
Yet this alone does not help pinpoint the failures of leftist parties in achieving their 
goals. The Left in Lebanon has used wrong strategies in its attempt to achieve 
important objectives. 
Lebanese leftist parties are an added value to the Lebanese society as a whole, 
but have yet to become a major player in it. Chapter two provided an insight into how 
leftist parties were able to bring Lebanon’s political conflict to an ideological level 
rather than a mere superficial conflict driven by sectarianism and personal interests. 
The victory of sectarianism over secularism was a major reason behind the eclipse of 
leftist parties in Lebanon. The LCP, as shown in chapter three, was unable to change 
Lebanon into a secular state but was capable of transforming sectarianism into a 
shameful notion. The emphasis on resistance discussed in the case studies of chapters 
three and five was a major reason behind the party’s downfall in the post-war phase. 
Yet resistance was inevitable otherwise the country would have remained under 
Israeli occupation. 
Aside from the establishment of the resistance against the Israeli occupation, a 
major accomplishment of the left was their contribution to cultural and intellectual 
work, especially by the LCP and CAO. Thus, even though their political power has 
significantly decreased, their cultural output has kept the leftist spirit alive in the 
minds of the new generations. As for the PSP, Kamal Junblat was able to change the 
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methods applied in the sectarian system from a policy of distributing personal gains to 
decoding real reform. If Junblat’s influence and power along with the strength he 
brought to the Left and the PSP’s lenient ideology would have been managed 
differently, the course of reform in Lebanon may have taken a different path.  
The setbacks of the LCP, PSP, and other leftist parties are the reasons why 
Lebanon has surrendered to the confessional system. These setbacks have led to the 
marginalization of demands for social and economic reform in the post-war period. 
The mistakes of the LCP are interrelated. The involvement in the civil war and its 
sectarian traits led to the marginalization of social welfare demands and the lack of 
internal democracy undermined the credibility of the party. The subordination to the 
Comintern left the LCP immersed in regional politics, incapable of anchoring its 
choices on the demands of the Lebanese. Consequently, citizens were unable to relate 
to the LCP on a national scale.   
Suffering from different setbacks, the PSP has landed on similar grounds: the 
marginalization of social-economic demands. While participating in the civil war 
under the banner of secularism and reform, the party was immersed into the existing 
confessional system. Therefore the PSP’s internal structure of sectarian-secular and 
feudal-socialist conflicts backfired, giving in to the confessional system. This conflict 
might have weighed differently if Kamal Junblat had built firm social reform alliances 
with the LCP in the late 1940s. Instead he only chose to ally with leftist parties when 
regional politics changed the Lebanese balance of power. If those reforms were built 
decades before the right-left wing/Palestinian clash, social economic reform may have 
been acknowledged as a national priority.  
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6.2 – Politics Triumphs Over Reform  
The leftist parties’ strategies in Lebanon were dominated by political and 
ideological agendas rather than economic and social reforms. This thesis has 
underscored how leftist parties in Lebanon lacked consistency in labor demands 
especially during wartime, although such demands could have paved the way for real 
reforms and may have allowed the left stronger national appeal. After all, individuals 
participating in worldwide movements against capitalist globalization are not 
consciously opposed to capitalism, but initially revolt against the effects of capitalism 
on their own living standard (Taaffe 2004: 10). 
To better understand the mistakes of the Lebanese Left in implementing its 
social reform, the next section briefly compares with actions of the Labor Party of 
Britain, a Centre Left democratic social party, and the Popular Front of France, a 
coalition of France’s Left-wing movements. It is important to note that both the 
British and the French experiences have been through numerous setbacks. The 
following discussion addresses some of their achievements that are relevant to the 
experiences of leftist parties in Lebanon.  
 
6.3 – Trade Unions in Wartime 
One of the greatest achievements of the LCP is the establishment of trade 
unions. Through them the LCP was able to establish itself as well as struggle for labor 
rights. It is this approach in particular that brought to Lebanon some major social 
reforms. The amendment of the labor law, the social security legislation, and the 
health insurance policy are some of those reforms. The British Labour Party (BLP) 
was founded on similar grounds. It can be described as a coalition of trade unions and 
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socialists covering different political perceptions but mainly committed to the 
representation of labor interests (Worley, 2005: 218).  
It is only during the later stages of the LCP, and in particular when war was 
approaching, that the party’s actions became excessively immersed in politics. This 
affected the unions’ role in protecting labor interests. The BLP, on the other hand, and 
after it secured party development, its emphasis was geared towards Britain’s social 
and economic well-being. The party’s relationship with trade union movements was 
integral to its constitution and identity (Worley, 2005:219). The unions’ role increased 
during World War II. Their participation during wartime, combined with the political 
efforts of the Labour Party, war reproduced in the form of pro-labor legislations 
(Mclvor, 2001: 219). 
The LCP and other leftist parties prioritized the political situation over labor 
reforms during the civil war. They continued to do so while at war with the Israelis. 
Resistance was a priority despite the fact that wartime inflicts burdens on the people. 
This is not to reduce the value of the LCP’s role in the resistance, but rather to draw 
attention to how this affected its reform agenda. The LCP could have concentrated on 
resistance while the CAO, for example, could have worked on maintaining social 
services through their influence in the trade unions, or the other way around. A 
similar distribution of roles was practiced in Britain during WWII. The basis of the 
coalition was divided into two functions. Winston Churchill ran the military side of 
the war while the Labor ministers looked after the home front by maintaining social 
services and mobilizing human power (Cole, 1948: 386-388). Thus, social services 
increased through the care of trade unions at many levels: health and welfare, transfer 
of labor, machine staffing, technology, price rate fixing and welfare payment fixing 
(Cole 1948: 392).   
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Labour ministers insured that trade unions received political recognition and 
directly advised the unions on collective bargaining, wartime demands and planning 
(Mclvor, 2001: 226-227). Through the unions’ efforts, the state added steps to the 
process of compulsory arbitration. Other wartime restrictions were imposed, such as 
the Essential Work Order and the development of occupational medicine and state 
sponsored research. Through creating joint industrial councils and collective 
bargaining, unions were able to expand wages while keeping working hours stable 
(Mclvor, 2001: 105 and 134 and 210). Labour policies during wartime led to the 
narrowing of wealth inequalities while the real value of wage incomes increased by 
18 percent from 1938 – 1947 (Mclvor, 2001:224). 
The Labour Party was not only successful in maintaining social order; the 
efficiency of the wartime economy gave legitimacy to the concept of common or 
national ownership, a matter that appealed to the trade unionists whether or not they 
supported socialism (Worley, 2005: 8). In 1945, after Germany had surrendered, 
general elections were held in Britain, the first since 1935. The Labour Party’s social 
commitments did not go unnoticed. It won the elections and a welfare state was 
subsequently organized. The National Insurance Act of 1946 was established with all 
British citizens entitled to unemployment benefit, sickness benefit, old age pensions 
and widows pensions. The National Health Service was also introduced in 1948 
(Cole, 1948: 463-468) 
 
6.4 – Out of Power Social Reforms 
The Left’s lack of official representation is a reason behind its inability to 
change the Lebanese system. But this lack of representation also led leftists in general 
to choose broad principles, of which secularism is the most popular. Although such 
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principles are the bases of the left, and an essential aspect of reform, it is very difficult 
to implement them or even achieve their broad acceptance before transforming 
Lebanon from a quasi-federal non-state model to a civil state based on the idea of 
equal rights among all its citizens. A necessary part of this process is spreading a 
sense of belonging to the state among the labor class through improving its standards 
of living and shaping a sustainable social security network.  
During the inter-war period (1919-1938) the BLD was out of office. 
Nevertheless it helped improve living standards put its socialist principles into 
practice on a small scale (Cole, 1948: 466). The BLP’s members were minorities in 
their councils but they mounted campaigns to protect and increase living standards 
level. They worked on detailed reform demands and adopted a policy of municipal 
socialism to work out problems such as poor health, insufficient housing and general 
security.  
If the Lebanese Left-wing had initiated cooperation with one another at an 
early stage, a higher level of social reform could have been accomplished. With the 
PSP in parliament and a minority in the government and the LCP’s large influence on 
trade unions, reform could have been possible. In Britain, the BLP’s campaigning 
enabled them to pass legislations allowing working class families who have no 
bathrooms to use public bath for free and distributing free milk and meals for school 
children. Through their campaigns to improve the access to health care, they were 
able to introduce medical aid associations in 1944, when they were a minority in the 
government, and a maternity and child welfare centre (Worley 2005: 170 and 169 
and198-200). In 1934, they were able to raise London households to 31 percent, and 
use the profits to treat London’s poor and provide homes, additional free education, 
and enhance hospitals (Hogan, Time Magazine 11 March 1935). The social welfare 
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policy adopted by the BLP did not only bring assistance to the poorest sectors of 
society but also provided employment chances and self-development methods through 
the funding of education and library facilities (Worley, 2005: 167). 
By promoting legislation in favor of labor, the BLP developed from a pre-war 
pressure group to a national opposition, and then a minority government in 1924, and 
finally won a majority in the 1945 parliamentary elections. According to Worley this 
was an extraordinary accomplishment, changing British politics forever and serving to 
constitute a new age of mass democracy (2005: 20-21).unlike the BLP in Britain, the 
LCP  in Lebanon was able to rise to the position of a national opposition, settled in 
this position for a long period and then gradually declined. As for the PSP, it began as 
a minority group in government with social demands but degenerated into a sectarian 
party. The decline of the two most influential leftist parties in Lebanon is in part a 
consequence of their elitist ideological principles, rather than popular demands that 
citizens could relate to.   
 
6.5 – Elections on a United Platform 
As Jonathan Olsen notes, all parties progress within a triangle defined by three 
strategic goals: a policy goal where parties seek to exploit their impact in public 
policy, an office seeking goal were they try to achieve political power, and a votes 
goal were they seek to maximize their share of votes in electoral competition (2010: 
8). While out of power, Lebanon’s leftists did not maximize their impact on public 
policy. They were also unable to maximize their vote shares and thus could not reach 
office since influential left-wing movements in Lebanon never ran for elections as a 
united group. Moreover, they only allied together after decades of their formation, and 
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when they did, the core of their alliance was the Palestinian cause. This dynamic 
should be compared to the experience of the Popular Movement of France. 
The Popular Front of France was formed in 1934. It was an alliance of Left-
wing movements that included the French Communist Party (PCF), the Radical and 
Socialist Party, and the French Section of the Workers’ International. This front was 
formed as a reaction to the economic crises caused by the Great Depression, the 
financial scandals and the instability of the government, and the rise of the Nazis in 
Germany. Thus, it was an alliance that stemmed from domestic concerns but also a 
collective concern towards an external enemy. The Popular Front’s concerns were 
similar to Lebanon’s left-wing parties: internal social disorder, corruption in 
bureaucracies, and an external enemy.  
This alliance led the Socialists in France to win more seats than the Radicals 
during the 1936 general elections, two years after the foundation of the coalition. The 
Popular Front won 386 out of 608 seats. Even though their alliance did not last long in 
power, during their term in office they worked on social reform demands rather than 
external politics (Evans, 2003: 76-78and Dutton, 2004: 118). The Popular Front 
government worked on implementing reform in an accelerated manner. It introduced 
new labor laws, created the right to strike, imposed collective bargaining on wage 
contracts, and increased wages by 12 percent. It also reduced the workweek from 48 
hours to 40 hours, granted workers two weeks of paid holidays, and suspended the 
civil servant wage cut. The first public budget of the Popular Front increased 
progressive taxation but decreased standard taxes from 17.4 to 15.8 % of GDP. The 
Popular Front was able to accomplish 133 governmental laws within 73 days in 
parliament. The Bank of France was democratized with more representation from the 
government. The parliament voted for the creation of a wheat office to alleviate prices 
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and control speculation, the arms industry was nationalized, measures against illegal 
price hikes were taken, and loans to medium and small sized industries were given 
(Beaudry and Portier 2001: 76)   
The Lebanese Left neither reached power united, nor did it unite to achieve its 
reforms. When they did unite under the LNM the reform battles of Lebanon had 
already taken shape. General elections had taken place over four times in the years 
that the two most influential leftist parties, the LCP and the PSP, had been 
established. However they only decided to run under a common electoral platform in 
1972, when the Palestinian conflict in Lebanon had surfaced and the spiral to civil 
war had started. This undermined their ability to adduce their reforms. The French 
Popular Front’s experience shows that a different path in Lebanon could have been 
taken had leftist parties allied together over twenty years before the civil war had 
erupted under a social reform agenda, and had they run for elections under a united 
platform. By forming a reform coalition leftist parties could have gained the labor 
class’ confidence on a broad level. This process would have brought larger national 
appeal to the LNM’s secular state platform. 
 
6.6 – The Left: Is it Right for Lebanon? 
Today Lebanon is highly infected with corruption, backwardness, and 
overwhelmed with the interests of leaders over workers. Lebanon’s confessional state 
has proven to be unviable. It has developed a sense of belonging of the citizen to his 
predatory sectarian leader instead of belonging to the state as a whole. 
Thus a need for system change in Lebanon is acknowledged even by sectarian 
leaders themselves. The leftists’ secular demands are valid guidelines for a modern 
state, how to achieve this state remains elusive. The left in Lebanon must play a 
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primary role in this process. Shaping a secular state requires the recovery of the 
Lebanese Left wing. Once secularism is prioritized over foreign politics, internal 
political conflict, or an external enemy then social and economic reforms could 
become the guidelines for action under a united leftist umbrella. Lebanon needs a 
secular civil state based on equal rights for all. But to do this requires a healthier 
economy. Common sense will prevail only after citizens are relieved from the burdens 
of poor living standards. Their dependence on sectarian leaders will decrease, their 
positive reception of the parties behind the battles of reform will increase and thus 
secularism can become a viable option for Lebanon. 
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